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PARTICIPATORY PROCEDURE AND






A. 'Reluctant Agencies" and 'Reformist Agencies"
A principal concern of modem administrative law is the capability
of persons interested in and affected by administrative actions to have
adequate opportunity to present their views in the agency's decision-
making processes. This concern is reflected in major doctrinal develop-
ments concerning the standards applicable to judicial review of the
actions of administrative agencies possessing broad statutory grants of
discretionary authority.' Similar concerns are reflected in efforts to
fashion judicial and statutory principles intended to extend the legal
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the Center for Law and Health Sciences, Boston University School of Law. Funds for their work
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1. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 461 U.S. 402 (1971), in which
the Supreme Court discussed the relevant standard applicable upon judicial review of an agency
action-in that case, the determination of the Secretary of Transportation to authorize federal
funds to construct a highway through Overton Park in Memphis, Tennessee. Construing the pro-
visions of § 10(e)(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976), that an
action may be overturned if found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law," the Court stated:
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a con-
sideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear errot of judgment.
Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard
of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency.
Id at 416. See also Wright, The Courts and the Rule-making Process: The Limits of Judicial Re-
view, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 375 (1974).
The standard enunciated by the Supreme Court suggests two principles: that in arriving at its
decision the agency should give evidence that it has considered various perspectives on the rele-
vant issue before the agency, not merely the views of one of the affected parties; and that the
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capacity of interested parties to participate effectively in agency pro-
ceedings.2 The multiple sources for this concern include the following:
the belief that agencies, particularly regulatory agencies, tend to favor
better organized and better financed interests at the expense of inade-
quately represented perspectives3; a sense that administrative agencies
become increasingly isolated from and indifferent to outside interests,
that is, become "bureaucratized" and pursue their own self-interest 4;
the recognition that governmental agencies require access to multiple
sources of information to ascertain what is in the public interest, and
that this information is best provided by directly affected interests5; a
reviewing court's responsibility is nonetheless a narrow one, not permitting it to question the pol-
icy judgments of the agency to the extent there has been no "clear error of judgment." Id
For a discussion of the meaning of "clear error ofjudgment" in Overton Park and the possi-
ble confusion arising from the Court's use of that term in the context of that case, see Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 n.74 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
With respect to the first principle gleaned from the Overton Park standard, compare Automo-
tive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968), in which, in the context of a
rulemaking proceeding, the court stated that one of its functions was to assure that "the disap-
pointed have had the opportunity provided by Congress to try to make their views prevail." Id at
343.
2. With respect to standing to participate in an agency proceeding, see Office of Communi-
cations of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
With respect to the financing of public participation in agency proceedings, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 57a(h)(1) (1976) (financing of public participation in Federal Trade Commission proceedings);
W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 729-30 (6th ed. 1974).
With respect to standing to challenge an agency action, see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
With respect to efforts to assure that adequate consideration is given to all affected interests,
see Automotive Parts Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Office of Commu-
nications of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Seealso ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1971-1972 REPORT at 11-12, 37-38 (1972).
Further indications of the movement toward enhancing the possibility and quality of general
public participation in agency proceedings include the trend toward favoring rulemaking over
adjudication as the mode for agency policy development, see National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n
v. FCC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1975), and enactment of the
Freedom of Information Act and its subsequent amendment to strengthen the public's capacity to
obtain disclosable agency documents, see Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 552, 80 Stat. 383 (1966) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
See generally Stewart, The Reformation ofAmerican Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1667, 1723-90 (1975).
3. See Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communications of
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 549-50 (D.C. Cir. 1969); G. ROSENBAUM, THE
POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN (1973); Cramton, The "hy, Where and How of Broad.
ened Public Particiation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEo. L.J. 525 (1972); Stewart, supra
note 2, at 1684-85; Danfield, Representationfor the Poor in FederalRulemaking, 67 MICH. L. REV.
511 (1969).
4. E. TROXEL, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 69-70 (1947); Cutler & Johnson, Regu-
lation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J. 1395, 1404-05 (1975); Leone, Public Interest Advocacy
and the Regulatory Process, 400 ANNALS 46, 50-51 (1972).
5. G. STIGLER & F. COHEN, CAN REGULATORY AGENCIES PROTECT THE CONSUMER? 15
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skepticism that the minimal notice and comment provisions of tradi-
tional administrative rulemaking procedures are not conducive to a
broad public awareness of the significant policy issues that the agencies
are addressing6 ; and the increasing technical sophistication of agencies
and the incapacity of many interested parties, absent highly developed
organizational and financial resources, to provide useful comments.'
These concerns generally proceed from what may be considered
the model of the "reluctant agency." This is an agency that possesses
significant discretionary authority vested by statute and that chooses,
deliberately or otherwise, to exercise its authority for the benefit of the
most economically and politically influential groups affected by its de-
cisions. This may be done passively by relying, for example, on ambig-
uous statutory mandates for change to justify making no change,
perpetuating thereby the prevailing power relationships'; or it may be
done actively by specifically making decisions to favor strong interests.'
In either circumstance, the agency is able to effectively preclude mean-
ingful participation in its policy development and decisionmaking
processes by less powerful or articulate groups.' 0 Critics of this type of
agency assume, at least in part, that increased participation by more
diverse interests may modify the substance of agency decisions. I
Not all administrative or regulatory agencies, however, fall into
the model of the "reluctant agency." Some agencies, at least during
some periods of their history, determine to exercise their discretionary
(1971); Stewart, supra note 2, at 1686; Gellhorn, Public Particioation in Administrative Proceedings,
81 YALE L.J. 359, 377-78 (1972).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d
Cir. 1977); National Welfare Rights Organization v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 637, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1976);
Rodway v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 814, (D.C. Cir. 1975).
7. See, e.g., J. MASHAW & R. MERRILL, INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 292-93 (1975).
8. See generally Rosenblatt, Health Care Reform andAdministrative Law" .4 Structural Ap-
proach, 88 YALE L.J. 243 (1978).
9. G. SCHUBERT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST 119 (1960); Green & Nader, Economic Regulation
vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopolyl Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 876 (1973). See also Geller, .4
Modest Proposalfor Modest Reform of the Federal Communications Commission, 63 GEO. L.J. 705
(1975).
10. Support for this result of agency action or inaction may have been provided in part by the
Supreme Court in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). The decision, establishing the specific requirements of the APA as
maximum procedural requirements, may cast doubt on the continuing validity of such cases as
Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1973), but would not appear to affect the trends
and policies described in notes 1 & 2, supra. See also Rosenblatt, supra note 8, at 322-26.
11. Rosenblatt, supra note 8, at 255.
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authority to reallocate economic power.' 2 These "reformist agencies"
are characterized by: (1) a willingness to perceive the "public interest"
as other than the interests of the dominant firms in the regulated indus-
try; (2) efforts to develop procedural devices for encouraging broader
participation in and awareness of the significance of decisionmaking
processes that the agency undertakes; and (3) attempts to produce deci-
sions that may substantially alter customary practices or traditional re-
lationships in the industry subject to regulatory authority.
One may expect a reformist agency to generate considerable politi-
cal opposition as it engages in efforts to reallocate existing political and
economic resources. To a substantial extent, it may be theorized, its
success depends on the explicitness of its statutory authority, the extent
to which that statutory authority represents a continuing public politi-
cal commitment to the agency's objectives, and the relationship be-
tween industry interests and nonindustry interests in monitoring and
evaluating the agency's activities. 13
Much analysis of administrative law focuses on the "reluctant
agency."' 4 Relatively little study has been devoted to the reformist
model, particularly the political process that surrounds the reformist
agency's efforts to achieve its objectives. This article will consider only
one type of reformist agency, that concerned with hospital cost contain-
ment, and will focus specifically on a relatively limited question:
whether openness of the agency's decisionmaking processes to broad
public participation-an objective sought by many of the critics of the
reluctant agencyt 5-- correlates with general political support for the
agency's programs and objectives. The article is not intended to pro-
vide a detailed framework for analysis of the "reformist agency"
model, but to serve as a starting point for further analysis.
B. Hospital Cost Containment Agencies as 'Reformist Agencies'" The
Massachusetts Experience
Many of the health regulatory agencies concerned with hospital
cost containment objectives tend, at least initially, to fall within the "re-
12. See Lazarus & Onek, The Regulators andthe People, 57 VA. L. REV. 1069, 1083-84 (1971)
(description of role of Federal Trade Commission under chairmanship of Miles Kirkpatrick).
13. See M. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 263-71
(1955).
14. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Moss v.
CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Office of Communications of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 425 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Lazarus & Onek, supra note 12.
15. See, e.g., Lazarus & Onek, supra note 12.
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formist" model: many agency policymakers perceive their role as at-
tempting to restructure traditional relationships in the hospital service
delivery system as a means of achieving cost containment objectives.
In Massachusetts, for example, a variety of statutory and administra-
tive programs have developed over the past eight years that attempt to
alter traditional power relationships and decisionmaking processes in
the hospital sector.' 6 The programs have sprung up out of concern for
the adverse societal and economic consequences of rapid increases in
hospital costs'"; their cost containment objectives are thus viewed as
being in accord with the "public interest." The logical products of such
a commitment are efforts to produce a restructuring of the hospital de-
livery system and a realignment of existing economic relationships.
Two programs have been established by explicit statutory author-
ity; a third effort, which is not yet sufficiently coherent to warrant being
called a "program," encompasses attempts to shrink the size of the ex-
isting hospital sector by closing or merging services or whole
institutions.
The two explicit statutory programs are "determination of need"
(DON)'8 and hospital budget review and approval (Chapter 409).' 9
DON is administered by the Department of Public Health (DPH), and
provides for review and approval by DPH of hospital applications to
undertake substantial capital expenditures and substantial changes in
service.20 Under the Chapter 409 program, hospitals must annually file
their budgets for review and approval by the Massachusetts Rate Set-
ting Commission (RSC).2 ' Both programs emerged from legislative
concerns about the cost of hospital care,22 and therefore commenced
16. See, e.g., Health Planning and Policy Committee of the Commonwealth, Health Care
Expenditures in Massachusetts 28-43 (1976).
17. Id at 25-27.
18. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11, §§ 25B-25G (Law. Co-op 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
19. Id ch. 6A, §§ 37-44 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
20. The two jurisdictional terms "substantial capital expenditure" and "substantial change in
service" are defined in id ch. 111, § 25B (Law. Co-op 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
21. Id ch. 6A, § 39 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
22. See Joint Special Committee Established to Make an Investigation and Study of Health
Benefits and Health Services for Every Citizen of the Commonwealth and Related Matters, In-
terim Report, H. No. 5968 (June 1972) (DON) [hereinafter cited as Interim Report of the Joint
Special Committee]. The history of Chapter 409 began with Law of July 9, 1975, ch. 424, § 10,
1975 Mass. Acts 449, which directed the Secretary of Human Services to submit "a proposal for a
comprehensive system for controlling the costs of purchasing hospital care in the commonwealth."
The proposal was submitted in October, 1975, together with draft legislation. See A Proposal
From the Secretary of Human Services for a Comprehensive Plan for Controlling the Cost of
Purchasing Hospital Services in the Commonwealth (1975). The draft legislation was revised and
resubmitted by the Governor in 1976 as H. No. 3160, which became the basis for hearings and
deliberations eventually producing Law of Oct. 15, 1976, cl. 409, 1976 Mass. Acts 522.
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operations with a background of public support for their objectives.
While it may be hypothesized that, even with their reformist objectives,
they would not necessarily fall into the model of "reformist agencies,
23
it does appear that both the DPH and the RSC have taken their respon-
sibilities seriously in making efforts to retard increases in hospital ex-
penditures.24 Since hospitals have become accustomed to making their
own decisions on expenditure levels, 25 it may be assumed that they
have not welcomed these new programs, and that they will attempt to
undermine them through formal and informal political techniques.
The capacity of the DPH and the RSC to handle such political
pressure is becoming especially important as Massachusetts attempts to
move beyond these established programs to pursue a cost containment
strategy that calls for "shrinking" the size of the hospital system by
forcing the merger or closure of services or entire institutions. Efforts
in Massachusetts to date to shrink the hospital system have been suc-
cessful only when one or more of three characteristics have prevailed:
(1) with respect to services, elimination of the service could perceptibly
enhance the financial circumstances of the hospital, and perhaps assure
a higher level of quality26 ; (2) with respect to whole institutions, the
hospital's financial status has been marginal for reasons not directly
related to the cost containment programs; and (3) again with respect to
whole institutions, the hospital was providing care of marginal quality,
and closure was possible on quality, not cost containment, grounds.
Whether shrinking becomes a useful cost containment strategy27 de-
pends on the extent to which the state can promote the closing or par-
tial closing of hospitals on grounds of cost savings alone, and not only
in situations in which either the quality of care or the financial well-
being of the hospital is already marginal. The political tasks associated
with achieving such a result are made more complex because Massa-
23. See, e.g., Rosenblatt, supra note 8, at 247-49.
24. See Fielding & Weiner, Controlling Hospital Costs in Massachusetts, 299 NEw ENGLAND
J. MED. 1249 (1978); Bicknell & Van Wyck, Certificate of Need: The Massachusetts Experience,
January 1974-June 1977 (1978) (copy on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Reiel). For
an explicit statement on the RSC's cost containment policy, see Statement of Massachusetts Rate
Setting Commission Concerning Blue Cross Participating Hospital Agreement HA-27, at 1 (No-
vember 10, 1977) [hereinafter cited as RSC HA-27 Statement (1977)].
25. Weiner, 'Reasonable Cost" Reimbursement for Inpatient Hospital Services Under Medi-
care and Medicaid" The Emergence of Public Control, 3 AM. J. L. & MED. 1, 42-46 (1977).
26. See, e.g., Donahue, Pettigrew, Young & Ryan, The Closure ofMaternity Services in Mas-
sachusetts: 7he Causes, Process, and Hospital Impact, 50 OB. & GYN. 280 (1977).
27. Some question has been raised about the cost efficacy of mergers. See, e.g., Treat, The
Performance of Merging Hospitals, 14 MED. CARE 199 (1976).
[Vol. 571202
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chusetts, unlike New York,28 has no specific statute authorizing the
state to decertify facilities. The agencies in Massachusetts concerned
with effectuating the "shrinkage" strategy must attempt to achieve the
desired policy result using what is at best ambiguous statutory
authority.29
Political support strategies derived from this ambiguous statutory
authority may of course profit from evidence of strong political support
for the DON and Chapter 409 programs themselves. Conversely, the
fading of support for even such explicit programs may raise questions
about the long-term political viability of the "shrinkage" strategy. In a
sense, the legal authority for the implementation of "shrinkage" strate-
gies under DON and Chapter 409 may be a matter of concern secon-
dary to considerations of the political capacities of the respective
28. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2806 (McKinney 1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
29. The bill submitted in 1976 by Governor Michael S. Dukakis, H. No. 3160, which initiated
the legislative process producing Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, 1976 Mass. Acts 522 (codified in
scattered sections of MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978)), contained provi-
sions specifically incorporating into the hospital budget review process the findings from reviews
of the appropriateness of institutional services undertaken by the regional and state planning
agencies. See H. No. 3160, ch. 6A, § 38(b). Such reviews could produce recommendations for
closing or merging services or entire institutions. Although the provision was not adopted, the
final version of Chapter 409 does contain language that arguably could permit the RSC to incor-
porate appropriateness review findings into budget reviews. See Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409,
§ 5, 1976 Mass. Acts 522 (requiring adoption of a definition of "reasonable financial require-
ments"). See also Weiner, A4ppropriateness Review and Rate Setting, in PRELIMINARY AP-
PROACHES TO APPROPRIATENESS REVIEW UNDER P.L. 93-641, at 64-67 (1978). The concept of
"appropriateness review" emanates from 42 U.S.C.A. § 3001-2(b) (West Supp. 1979), which re-
quires that health systems agencies undertake such reviews periodically and make findings
thereon.
The potential authority in the DPH to pursue a shrinkage strategy is somewhat more specula-
tive. Law of July 18, 1972, ch. 776, § 3, 1972 Mass. Acts 721 (codified as amended at MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 111, § 25C (Law. Co-op 1975)) provides:
The department, in making any such determination [of need], shall encourage appropri-
ate allocation of private and public health care resources and the development of alter-
native or substitute methods of delivering health care services so that adequate health
care services will be made reasonably available to every person within the common-
wealth at the lowest reasonable aggregate cost.
See Interim Report of the Joint Special Committee, supra note 22, at 27-28. In addition, Law of
July 18, 1972 established a time period within which the DPH was to "approve or disapprove, in
whole or in part, or otherwise act" upon an application. Id (emphasis added).
Relying on such language, DPH attempted to condition approvals of pending applications on
consolidation or closure activities involving institutions not formally before the Department with
a DON application. See Reeder, Mason & Glantz, Certifcate of Need" The Aassachusetts Experi-
ence, I AM. J. L. & MED. 13, 21-28 (1975). Because of the political response to these efforts, in
1975, the DPH adopted regulations narrowing the scope of conditions that could be attached to a
determination, see MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, MASSACHUSETTS DETER-
MINATION OF NEED REGULATIONS (November 9, 1976) [hereinafter cited as MASS. DON REGS.],
and in 1977, the legislature eliminated the "or otherwise act" language. See MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. I 1, § 25C (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978) as amended by Law of Jan. 9, 1978, ch. 945, § 4,
1977 Mass. Acts 1363. See also note 131 infra.
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programs and the ability of the agencies administering them to with-
stand sustained opposition by affected segments of the hospital
industry.
One vehicle available to a "reformist agency" for developing polit-
ical support in this context from nonhospital interests is the provision
of mechanisms for broad public participation in its policy development
and decisionmaking processes. In the case of "reluctant agencies," de-
mands by outside groups that the agency provide such mechanisms are
usually intended to change the policies of the agency. In the case of
"reformist agencies," on the other hand, the agency itself may wish ac-
tively to develop and indeed exploit the mechanisms for public partici-
pation to provide a means for developing or demonstrating support for
the agency's policy goals. Particularly when the agency's objectives are
opposed by strong and organized interests, mechanisms for public par-
ticipation can significantly enhance public visibility and political sup-
port for those objectives.
30
In considering the continuing viability of such cost containment
programs as DON and Chapter 409, and the likelihood of "shrinkage"
strategies being successfully implemented, a series of questions must be
addressed concerning the relationships among public policy objectives,
governmental process, availability of opportunities for public participa-
tion in agency decisionmaking, and the development and institutional-
ization of political support for reformist goals. This article will
consider specifically the experiences of DON and Chapter 409 in Mas-
sachusetts; features of and lessons derived from these experiences will
be of significance as governmental efforts to pursue cost containment
objectives through "shrinkage" strategies intensify.
The questions considered are the following:
(1) Do the DON and Chapter 409 programs provide procedural
mechanisms that facilitate participation by diverse interest groups in
30. This concept of an agency using open participatory procedures as a vehicle for develop-
ing political support is related to notions of "structural due process," which include the view that
assuring adequate public participation in agency proceedings may affect substantive outcomes of
agency decisions. See generally Rosenblatt, supra note 8. The present article moves somewhat
beyond the case studies employed by Rosenblatt in that it assumes an affirmative willingness on
the part of the regulatory agencies, DPH and RSC, to involve in their proceedings a more cross-
sectional array of interest groups than ordinarily participate in regulatory procedures in order to
assure that their decisions will be substantially different from those coming from "reluctant agen-
cies." One conclusion that may be derived from the present article is that efforts to produce
agency decisions conducive to the broad public interest, at least in the area of health services
regulation, involve a far more complex set of tasks than even proponents of "structural due proc-
ess" might suggest.
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their policy formulation and decisionmaking processes and that may
provide the structure for developing political support for the programs?
(2) To what extent are these mechanisms in fact used by diverse
interests, particularly interests different from and perhaps opposed to
the most significant adversely affected economic interests subject to the
agencies' authority?
(3) If these procedural mechanisms have not assisted in produc-
ing support for the agencies' reformist objectives, what factors exist that
might be constraining concerned parties from providing active support
for these objectives?
(4) What strategies may be available to DPH and RSC to over-
come these constraints and to permit them to develop support for their
objectives? Are these strategies transferable to shrinkage objectives for
which there is no explicit statutory basis?
The efforts made to answer these questions in this article are pre-
liminary only; more analysis of the characteristics of the "reformist
agency" model and more empirical research is necessary to move be-
yond this preliminary stage. Nevertheless, a preliminary effort to ad-
dress these questions is worthwhile given the continuing discussions of
cost containment strategies at the federal and state levels of
government.
II. PROCEDURAL MECHANISMS FOR PARTICIPATION IN AGENCY
DECISIONMAKING
DPH and RSC enabling acts and regulations afford a number of
opportunities for public participation in major policy activities. The
devices that create these opportunities fall generally into three catego-
ries: general public notice and comment requirements applicable to
proposed regulations under the state's administrative procedure act
(APA)31; specific, statutorily established advisory or consultative
processes32; and interventions by groups of ten or more taxpayers (ten-
taxpayer interventions) in DPH review of DON applications.33 These
categories will be discussed in turn.
A. Public Notice and Comment
The Massachusetts APA establishes two major classes of regula-
31. See text accompanying notes 34-44 infra.
32. See text accompanying notes 41-61 infra.
33. See text accompanying notes 62-80 infra.
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tions, those that require public hearings and those that do not.34 A
public hearing is required when such a hearing is guaranteed as a mat-
ter of constitutional right, when a statute specifically calls for one or
when violation of a regulation is punishable by fine or imprisonment.
Other regulations may be issued without public hearing prior to adop-
tion.35 In either case the agencies must provide notice of the proposed
action or of the public hearing, whether the regulation is being
adopted, amended or repealed, within the time specified by the relevant
statute, when applicable, or at least twenty-one days prior to the action
or hearing. 36 Notice must be published; it must also be filed with the
Secretary of State and provided to parties who are specified in the rele-
vant statute or who have filed annually a request with the agency to
receive notice of actions with respect to proposed regulations.37 If the
proposed regulation is not one subject to a public hearing requirement,
the agency shall nevertheless "afford interested persons an opportunity
to present data, views or arguments in regard to the proposed action
orally or in writing."3
With respect to either type of regulation, the agency may adopt
regulations on an emergency basis without notice or a public hearing.
A regulation that ordinarily requires a public hearing prior to promul-
gation, however, may, if issued on an emergency basis, remain in effect
for no more than three months unless the agency gives notice and holds
a public hearing.39
The APA, then, provides a basic framework within which public
participation in agency rulemaking may occur. Although DPH's regu-
lations governing the DON program are primarily procedural,40 they
do contain substantive standards and criteria that have been included
in the basic regulation after public hearing.4 RSC's responsibilities,
other than under Chapter 409, must by statute be conducted in accord-
ance with regulations "after public hearing."42 Although a public hear-
ing requirement is not specifically included in the provisions governing
the Chapter 409 program, hospitals are subject to civil penalties for






40. See MASS. DON REGS., supra note 29.
41. Id at pts. 60-65.
42. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A, § 32 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
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making a charge or accepting payment based on a charge in excess of
that approved by the RSC, for failing to file information required by
regulations of the Commission or for falsifying such information.43
Consequently, regulations implementing Chapter 409 have been
promulgated after public hearing, except when the emergency provi-
sions have been invoked.
B. Advisory or Consultative Processes
Under its organic statute, the RSC is obliged to submit all pro-
posed regulations, including those implementing Chapter 409, at least
sixty days prior to promulgation for review and comment by the RSC's
Advisory Council." The Council consists of twenty-three members.
Seven are state officials or their designees, serving ex officio. 45 The re-
maining sixteen members are appointed by the Commission. Eight are
to be "providers, or representatives of provider organizations, whose
rates of reimbursement are determined by the commission," and eight
are to be "non-providers who have demonstrated experience in the field
of consumer advocacy and who have no financial interest in any pro-
vider of services whose rates of reimbursement are determined by the
commission. 46
Some additional requirements pertain to the provider and the non-
provider categories. No provider group may have more than one rep-
resentative on the Council unless all provider groups or classes are
already represented.47 Since the RSC establishes rates for more than
eight provider groups,48 the RSC in fact must decide which provider
groups will not be represented on the Council at any one time.49 Fur-
ther, within the nonprovider category, two of the eight must be selected
43. Id § 44.




48. Id § 32 provides that the RSC shall have sole responsibility for establishing "rates to be
paid providers of health care services by governmental units, including the division of industrial
accidents in the department of labor and industries," and for establishing charges "to be used by
state institutions for general health supplies, care, social, rehabilitative or educational services and
accommodations." Under this authority the RSC establishes rates or charges for hospitals, skilled
nursing facilities, intermediate care facilities, rest homes, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, podia-
trists, psychologists, home health agencies, neighborhood health centers, day-care centers, group
residence facilities for juvenile offenders, occupational, physical and speech therapists, state public
and mental health hospitals and state schools for the retarded, as well as other providers of health
rehabilitation and social services.
49. In its first appointment to the Council, the RSC named representatives for the following
provider classes: hospitals, long-term care facilities, physicians, pharmacists, home health agen-
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from recommendations "by state-wide organizations representing the
interests of the elderly," and two from recommendations of statewide
labor organizations, with one of the two selected specifically from rec-
ommendations of the State Labor Council, AFL-CIO °0
The RSC Advisory Council is entitled to sixty days to review and
comment on all regulations proposed by the RSC prior to promulga-
tion. It is to receive ten days advance notice of any public meeting or
hearing scheduled by the RSC or one of its bureaus.-" Other rights and
responsibilities are more generally stated: it "shall advise on the over-
all operation and policy of the commission and its bureaus, [and] shall
consider any item recommended by the commission, the chairman of
the council, a majority of the council members or by a subcommit-
tee."' 52 The enabling act envisions that much of the work of the Advi-
sory Council will be conducted by subcommittees created to
correspond directly to the operating bureaus of the RSC, perhaps as a
device for developing enhanced expertise and producing more immedi-
ate impact on early stages of the process of identifying issues for subse-
quent policy development.
With respect only to the Chapter 409 program, the statute provides
for two review processes in addition to that assigned the Advisory
Council. First, in developing regulations governing review of applica-
tions for charge modifications submitted by hospitals, the RSC must
consult with representatives of Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., the
Massachusetts Hospital Association, commercial insurance carriers,
and the health systems agencies.53 Similar consultations are mandated
before the RSC may adopt a methodology for grouping hospitals and
undertaking cost comparisons in approving hospital budgets. 4 Such
consultations are required even if the regulations are promulgated on
an emergency basis.
The second review process established by Chapter 409 is carried
out by yet another advisory group, the Hospital Policy Review Board.5
Unlike the Advisory Council, the Policy Review Board's responsibili-
cies, neighborhood health centers, day-care centers and group residential treatment facilities.
RSC Advisory Council files.
50. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A, § 34 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
51. The specification of Advisory Council rights is derived from id
52. Id. The Chairman of the Advisory Council is to be selected annually from among its
non-provider members. Id
53. Id § 37.
54. Id § 40.
55. Id § 34A.
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ties are limited to overseeing the RSC's implementation of Chapter 409
alone, and its membership is established not to represent state, pro-
vider, and nonprovider interests generally, but to offer a forum for
identified interests concerned about or affected by the administration of
that program-specifically, hospitals, physicians, health systems agen-
cies, Blue Cross, commercial insurance carriers, business, labor, and
the elderly. 6 Unlike the nonprovider members of the Advisory Coun-
cil, who are expected to be experienced in consumer advocacy, the Pol-
icy Board's nonprovider members are expected to have technical
proficiency in matters pertaining to hospital service delivery or
financing.
The rights and responsibilities of the Policy Board are more exten-
sive than those of the Advisory Council, It also is entitled to a sixty-
day review and comment period with respect to proposed regulations
implementing Chapter 409,58 but it has the right to more information
than merely the language of the proposed regulations themselves, be-
cause the RSC must issue an explanatory statement accompanying the
proposed regulations. 9 Unlike the Advisory Council, the Policy Board
is obliged to submit written comments on all proposed regulations, rec-
ommending approval, disapproval, or partial approval. If the RSC
does not accept a recommendation, it must provide the Board with a
written statement of its reasons for disagreement. Both the Board's rec-
ommendation and the RSC's statement become part of the record of
any public hearing held on the proposed regulation. Further, if the
Board has recommended against promulgation of a regulation, the
RSC must delay promulgation for at least twenty-one days to provide
the Board an opportunity to hold a public healing on the
recommendations.
Three additional rights of the Board are significant in determining
its relationship to the RSC. First, individual Board members are enti-
tled by statute not merely to present evidence at public hearings held
by the RSC on proposed Chapter 409 regulations, but to present wit-
56. Id
57. Id
58. The rights and responsibilities of the Policy Review Board specified in this and the next
paragraphs of the text are derived from id
59. There has as yet been no judicial determination with respect to the content or level of
detail expected to be included in the explanatory statement. Query whether judicial interpretation
of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1977), that an agency "shall incorporate in
the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose," would be applicble to
the RSC's responsibility to provide an explanatory statement. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA,
501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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nesses as well. Second, if four members of the Board (less than a stan-
dard quorum) so request, the Board is to hold a public hearing on its
own with respect to the RSC's policies and activities carried out under
Chapter 409. Finally, the Board is required to report at least annually
to the governor and the legislature on its findings, opinions and recom-
mendations for legislation, and copies of this report must be sent to the
Joint Legislative Committee on Health Care.
In summary, Chapter 409 provides for consultation with a cross-
section of affected interests on the issuance of all regulations, including
emergency regulations, and provides further that in issuing final regu-
lations under the program, the RSC must undergo three separate re-
view and comment processes involving a potentially very broad range
of interests. These three sets of review procedures are separate and dis-
tinct from the required notice and comment procedure under the APA.
Finally, at least one of the review processes, that undertaken by the
Hospital Policy Review Board, involves technically expert parties and
requires a clear explication on the part of the RSC of the policy objec-
tives associated with its implementation of Chapter 409.
The DPH, in promulgating DON regulations, is not required to
undergo consultative or review and comment processes similar to those
applicable to Chapter 409. The DON statute does, however, provide
for participation in the DON rulemaking process by health systems
agencies (HSAs), the regional planning agencies established under the
National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974.60
The participation rights of the HSAs are virtually identical to those of
the ten-taxpayer groups described below.6 The potential significance
of the HSAs in the DON rulemaking process is also discussed in Part V
below.
C. Ten-Taxpayer Interventions
The Massachusetts DON statute authorizes formal participation in
the regulatory process by a ten-taxpayer group. Specifically, any such
group may request a public hearing on a DON application, 62 and, if
aggrieved by the DPH determination, may file an appeal with the
Health Facilities Appeals Board. 63 In addition, a ten-taxpayer group
60. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3001-1 to 3001-2 (West Supp. 1979).
61. See text accompanying notes 62-80 infra.
62. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 11l, § 25C (Law. Co-op 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
63. Id § 25E (Law. Co-op 1975). The Health Facilities Appeals Board is established under
id ch. 6, § 166, as the administrative appellate body for determinations of need made by the DPH
1210 Vol. 57
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can go to court to enforce the provisions of the Act.64
While the vehicle of ten-taxpayer interventions has been used by
very diverse interests, 65 the statutory provision was probably intended
primarily to enhance "consumer" participation in the DON process.
66
Its underlying policy appears to address the need to inform consumers,
who then can play an effective role in decisions affecting the health care
delivery system. The statute's effort to increase consumer involvement
and responsibility is reflected in the composition of the Health Facili-
ties Appeals Board67 and in the Act's restructuring of the governing
body of the DPH, the Public Health Council, from a physician majority
to a nonprovider majority.68
DPH regulations implementing the DON program have provided
procedural rights to ten-taxpayer groups69 beyond those contained in
the statute. These are:
(1) Even if a ten-taxpayer group does not request a public hearing,
it is afforded a reasonable opportunity to comment on a DON applica-
tion. DPH is required to consider such comments, if filed in a timely
and proper manner, before acting on the application.7 °
under id ch. 111, § 25C (Law. Co-op 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978). The Board consists of a majority
of nonproviders. Its scope of review and procedures with respect to departmental determinations
is set forth at id § 25E (Law. Co-op 1975).
64. Id § 25G (Law. Co-op 1975). Although there is no specific provision in the statute for a
ten-taxpayer group to seek review of a decision by the Health Facilities Appeals Board, id § 25E
provides for judicial review of "final decisions" of the Board under the provisions of id ch. 30A,
§ 14 (Law. Co-op 1973 & 1978 Cum. Supp.), except to the extent the provisions of that section are
inconsistent with the provisions of id ch. 11, § 25E (Law. Co-op. 1975). Id ch. 30A, § 14 (Law.
Co-op 1973 & 1978 Cum. Supp.) provides for standing to seek judicial review of final agency
decisions by "any person. . . aggrieved by" such decisions. While it would be possible to argue
that ten-taxpayer groups with standing to appeal to the Health Facilities Board constitute ten
taxpayers aggrieved by adverse final decisions of the Board, a superior court has found that ten
taxpayers comprising an intervening group are not "persons aggrieved" within the meaning of the
statute. Shoolman v. Health Facilities Appeals Board, No. 30373 (Super. Ct., Suffolk Cty., Mass.
June 1, 1979).
65. See text accompanying notes 97-110 infra.
66. Interim Report of the Joint Special Committee, supra note 22, at 40.
67. See note 63 supra.
68. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 17, § 3 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978) provides that the Public
Health Council shall consist of the Commissioner of Public Health as Chairman and eight mem-
bers appointed by the Governor, three of whom shall be providers of health services and five of
whom shall be "nonproviders," a term defined in the same section. Prior to 1972, the Council
consisted of the Commissioner and six appointed members, of whom three were to be physicians,
and until 1975, Massachusetts law required that the Commissioner be a physician. Law of July 7,
1914, ch. 972, § 3, 1914 Mass. Acts 970. The statute now permits a non-physician to serve in the
position. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 17, § 2 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
69. MAss. DON REGS., supra note 29, § 14, establishes a procedure by which a ten-taxpayer
group may duly register with the DPH in order to be assured of the participation rights described
in the text accompanying notes 70-80 infra.
70. MAss. DON REGs., supra note 29, §§ 40.1 & 43.
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(2) Comments on hospital applications by appropriate HSAs, the
state comprehensive health planning agency, and, when relevant, the
Departments of Elder Affairs or Mental Health, are to be submitted to
all duly registered ten-taxpayer groups.7'
(3) If DPH's staff prepares a report on an application that rejects
specific recommendations submitted in writing by a ten-taxpayer
group, the staff report is to be available in the Department's public file
for at least twenty-one days before the DPH meeting scheduled to con-
sider the application, 72 and a copy of the staff report is to be mailed to
any affected, duly registered ten-taxpayer group.73
(4) If the staff report rejects a specific recommendation contained
in the written comments of a ten-taxpayer group, the group has the
right to respond in writing to the Department, provided certain proce-
dural requirements are satisfied.74 The group's written response is spe-
cifically included in the documentation presented to the Public Health
Council when it considers an application.7"
(5) The Commissioner of Public Health is required to establish the
agenda of applications to be considered by the Public Health Council
at least seven days prior to its scheduled meeting. No additional appli-
cations may then be included on the agenda without the consent of
interested parties, including any intervening ten-taxpayer group. At
least five days before the scheduled meeting, the Commissioner must
provide oral or written notice of the agenda to affected ten-taxpayer
groups.76 An applicant may request postponement of consideration of
his application, but a request is not to be granted if the Commissioner
determines that it would prejudice, among others, an affected ten-tax-
payer group.77 A ten-taxpayer group can itself request postponement,
but the regulations indicate that "said request will rarely be granted."
Exceptions to this general rule may occur when the Commissioner de-
termines that the request is for good cause and that failure to grant the
request will "significantly prejudice the party making the request from
having its position considered by the Council. 78
71. Id § 42.5.
72. Id § 44.3(2). If there is no disagreement between DPH staff and the ten-taxpayer group,
the staff report need be in the public file for only seven days. Id § 44.3(1).
73. Id § 44.3(2).
74. Id § 44.4.
75. Id
76. Id § 51.2.




(6) When an application generates conflicting positions, affected
ten-taxpayer groups may make oral presentations to the Council during
the meeting at which the application is considered. 9
Enumeration of these additional rights conferred on ten-taxpayer
groups reveals that the regulations go well beyond the skeletal language
of the statute to provide possibilities for organized ten-taxpayer groups
to have their views heard during departmental deliberations on DON
applications.80
III. EFFICACY OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION OPPORTUNITIES IN
SUPPORTING PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
The preceding descriptions suggest that statutes or regulations
governing operation of the two major cost containment programs in
Massachusetts provide substantial opportunity for members of the gen-
eral public and representatives of nonprovider interest groups to par-
ticipate in agency proceedings. Indeed in some cases they are able to
require the agency to explain its positions or policies that are not con-
sistent with the views of the particular outside interest.
There is no sound methodology to determine whether the "reform-
ist" RSC and DPH have made use of public participation through these
devices to develop a political constituency for or general public support
of the agencies' decisions. Two types of analysis, however, would indi-
cate whether there is a relationship between the availability of such
devices and general support for the cost containment objectives of the
DON and Chapter 409 programs. The first is an examination of actual
participation in and use of the processes.8' The second is a determina-
tion of the extent to which, despite the opportunities for public partici-
pation, external political opposition to the program has developed and
had an impact on the program's operation. 2 Some preliminary infor-
mation is available for these analyses with respect to Chapter 409 and
DON. The information suggests that constructive use of the proce-
dures occurs only in limited situations, and that the availability of the
79. Id § 51.6. The hearing before the Council is not an adjudicatory hearing. Id § 51.1.
Therefore, formal cross-examination would ordinarily not occur.
80. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 83-110 infra.
82. Successful opposition to a cost containment program, as represented, for example, by the
legislative overrides of DPH decisions under the DON program, see text accompanying notes 111-
30 infra, may indicate lack of potential support for the program's objectives. On the other hand,
the absence of political efforts to undercut a program's efficacy may suggest nothing more than the
program's ineffectiveness. See text accompanying notes 128-59 infra, for discussion of why there
has been little political opposition to administration of the Chapter 409 program.
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procedural devices does not necessarily protect the program from effec-
tive political opposition.
A. Use of Established Procedural Devices
1. Public Notice and Comment
The devices for public participation in the regulation issuance
process have been used relatively infrequently in implementing DON
because the regulations that have been issued are primarily procedural.
The incorporation of substantive standards and criteria into these regu-
lations generally follows a two-step process. The first is a so-called "ge-
neric" process involving widespread consultation among a diverse
group of interests outside of any formal procedural structure. 83 Ulti-
mately, the results of such an informal consultative process are formu-
lated into proposed regulations processed pursuant to APA
requirements. The informal process is significant, and its implications
are explored in somewhat greater detail below. 4 The informal process,
of course, does not entail the right of participation, which is a feature of
the formal procedural devices discussed earlier.
The RSC promulgates regulations governing administration of
Chapter 409 at least annually. No specific interest groups are required
to participate in the public notice and comment process, and anyone
from the general public may, under agency practice, testify at public
hearings or submit written comments into the record of the proceeding.
Since the inception of the Chapter 409 program,85 nine public hearings
have been held on implementing regulations.86 All but two of the pub-
lic hearings consisted exclusively of testimony submitted by RSC staff,
hospital representatives, or spokesmen for the Massachusetts Society of
Certified Public Accountants, the members of which are responsible for
preparing financial information for hospitals. The only other group to
be represented at any of the hearings has been the Massachusetts Con-
83. For a description of this process, see MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF PUBLIC HEALTH, DRAFT
STATE HEALTH PLAN §§ 1.15-1.16 (1978). See also Feeley & Feldman, Certificate of Need Regu-
lations, pts. A, C (undated draft prepared for Executive Programs in Health Policy, Planning and
Regulation, Harvard School of Public Health).
84. See text accompanying notes 211-220 infra.
85. For purposes of this discussion, the Chapter 409 program encompasses not only the pro.
gram established by Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, 1976 Mass. Acts 522 (codified in scattered
sections of MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978)), but also the predecessor
interim program established by Law of July 9, 1975, ch. 424, 1975 Mass. Acts 449.
86. Below is a listing of the proposed implementation regulations and hearing dates for both
the Chapter 409 program and the predecessor interim program established under Law of July 9,
1975, ch. 424, 1975 Mass. Acts 449 through June 1979:
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sumer Council, a state agency responsible for advocating consumer in-
terests generally,87 and Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc.
This lack of general public participation at the hearings may be
explained in part by the highly technical nature of the material in-
cluded in the regulations. The RSC employs a formula approach88 to
develop allowable cost, revenue, and charges; accordingly, many of its
regulations are devoted to such mathematical constructs as the method-
ology for calculating cost increases due to inflation in the economy gen-
erally 89 or net increases in the volume of services the hospital
provides.90 While each of the technical features of such a regulation
reflects potentially significant policy decisions, an adequate under-
standing of the implications of these decisions, because of the technical
nature of the materials, is generally beyond the capacity of most per-
sons not trained in the relatively new techniques of rate regulation. Ex-
pertise, at least currently, is limited to agency staff, the providers, and
some of the groups represented on the Hospital Policy Review Board.
Indeed, it may very well be that the lack of participation at Chapter 409
public hearings is a result of the availability of the Hospital Policy Re-
view Board and the consultative processes under Chapter 409 as the
focus for participation by those parties that already possess sufficient
technical proficiency to understand the intricacies of the proposed reg-
Proposed Regulation Hearing Date Legislative Authority
14 CHSR 4 October 3, 1975 Law of July 9, 1975, ch.
424, 1975 Mass. Acts 449
14 CHSR 4 March 16, 1976 Id
14 CHSR 4 April 27, 1976 Id
14 CHSR 9 January 10, 17, 1977 Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch.
409, 1976 Mass. Acts 522
14 CHSR 9 March 21, 1977 Id
114.1 CMR 4.00 April 18, 1978 Id
114.1 CMR 8.00 August 9, 1978 Id
114.1 CMR 8.00* October 27, 1978 Id
114.1 CMR 8.00* January 24, 1979 Id
* Amendments only
87. The Council is established under MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6, § 115 (Law. Co-op 1973).
Among its responsibilities is that of informing the public, "through appearances before ... state
... commission . . . hearings .... of such policies [and] decisions ... as are beneficial or
detrimental to consumers." Its membership consists of the Attorney General, the Chairman of the
Department of Public Utilities, the Commissioners of Banks, Insurance, and Labor and Indus-
tries, ex offieiis, and eight members appointed by the Governor, of whom one is to be a member of
the State Labor Council, AFL-CIO. Id
88. For a general discussion of different approaches to ratesetting, see Bauer, Hospital Rate
Seting-This Way to Salvation?, 59 MILBANK MEM. FUND Q. 117 (1977).
89. See, e.g., Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission Regulation, 114.1 C.M.R. § 8.11
(1978).
90. Id at 8.12-13.
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ulations. Less knowledgeable members of the general public may be
constrained by the existence of such mechanisms merely to state sup-
port for the general approach of the RSC (to the extent that it may be
gleaned from the regulations) or not to participate in the process, with
the expectation that more expert parties can capably represent their
interests. 9'
Whatever the explanation, the availability of public hearings prior
to promulgating Chapter 409 regulations has not served to provide the
RSC with diverse views, separate from any analyses undertaken by the
Hospital Policy Review Board, nor has it therefore enabled the agency
to create a general public understanding of its processes and policy
objectives.
2. Advisory Council and Review Board
There have been significant differences in the roles played by the
RSC Advisory Council and the Hospital Policy Review Board estab-
lished under Chapter 409.92 The Advisory Council had nine vacancies
as of January 1, 1979: one in the nonprovider labor category, three in
the general nonprovider category and five in the provider category.
The only provider groups represented on the Council as of that date
were physicians, residential child care programs and day-care services.
The Council had not met as a formal body with a quorum present since
November 14, 1977. It has never submitted any formal written com-
ments on any proposed RSC regulation, nor has it submitted even in-
formal comments on proposed Chapter 409 regulations.
In contrast, as of January 1, 1979, the Hospital Policy Review
Board had met twenty-one times since its formation in February 1977.
As required by statute, it had made formal recommendations to the
RSC on all proposed Chapter 409 regulations. In a number of in-
stances, it has recommended changes, the substance of which has on all
of these occasions been incorporated into the regulations ultimately
promulgated. It is significant that the Board generally supports the pol-
icies of the RSC and that, when there has been specific disagreement,
the RSC has generally accepted the Board's recommendations as being
91. Such an attitude raises the distinct possibility that the administrative agency itself will
increasingly assume that it can discern the public interest without the necessity of participation by
diverse groups representing different perspectives. For an expression of concern about adminis-
trative agencies assuming this responsibility, see Office of Communications of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
92. For a description of these bodies, see text accompanying notes 44-58 supra. The details
concerning meetings and actions of the two bodies are derived from RSC files.
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consistent with the objectives of the agency.93
Differences in the composition, rights and responsibilities of the
two advisory groups may account for some of these differences in per-
formance. First, the members of the Board are statutorily specified to
include the major interest groups that are concerned about and affected
by the Chapter 409 program, and some level of technical proficiency in
ratesetting issues is either assumed or required.9 4 In contrast, the Advi-
sory Council consists of persons drawn from very diverse interest back-
grounds. Their capacity to concentrate on any one set of issues is
limited, for example, by the requirement that no more than one mem-
ber represent any one provider group. There is no established necessity
for expertise in ratesetting matters.95
Second, the Advisory Council is expected to review all ratesetting
regulations, which cover an extensive set of health providers, institu-
tional and noninstitutional, as well as social and educational, service
providers. Since the agency issues numerous regulations annually,96 it
is difficult for the Council to focus consistently on a specific set of pol-
icy issues. The Board, on the other hand, considers only one program,
can follow its evolution sequentially and can develop a level of sophis-
tication concerning policy choices based on a consistent and continuous
familiarity with the program as it unfolds.
Third, the Board's statutory right to demand explanations from
the agency when policy differences emerge, and to delay somewhat
promulgation of regulations, enables the Board to be a "presence" in
agency decisions. If major disputes develop, the Board may initiate its
own public hearings and may report its views directly and officially to
the governor and to the legislature. These rights, coupled with the ex-
pertise possessed by individual Board members, make it a serious force
93. A major policy dispute emerged between the RSC and a majority of Hospital Policy
Review Board members with respect to the changes required by Chapter 409 to be implemented
by October 1, 1978. See text accompanying notes 152-154 infra. The RSC adopted a position
closer to that of the Board majority. The resulting proposed amendments to 114.1 CMR 8.00 were
the subject of a public hearing held on October 27, 1978.
94. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A, § 34A (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978) requires that the non-
provider members of the Board have "experience in or knowledge of the delivery or financing of
hospital services."
95. Id § 34 requires that nonprovider members of the Council be persons "who have demon-
strated experience in the field of consumer advocacy and who have no financial interest in any
provider of services whose rates of reimbursement are determined by the commission."
96. For example, in fiscal year 1976 (July 1, 1975 - June 30, 1976), the RSC issued 39 regula-
tions, including amendments and emergency regulations. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
RATE SETTING COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1976, at 62-65 (1977). In fiscal
year 1977, the number was 14. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS RATE SETTING COMMIS-
SION, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1977, at 56-57 (1978).
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that must be given due weight by the RSC in deciding on the content of
Chapter 409 regulations.
3. Ten-Taxpayer Interventions
The right of ten-taxpayer groups to participate in the processing of
DON applications has been invoked with some frequency. During the
period January 1974 through June 1977, one or more ten-taxpayer
groups participated in 63 of the 517 DON project applications, a partic-
ipation rate of 12.2%.17 Of the total number of projects processed dur-
ing this period, 226 were based on hospital applications,98 and of those,
29, or 12.8%, involved ten-taxpayer group participation.99
A recent analysis of the Massachusetts DON experience concludes
with respect to ten-taxpayer group interventions, that "more often than
not ten-taxpayer groups are directly or indirectly convened, supported
and organized by providers to support their own applications or by
competing or potentially competing applicants."'00 One of the authors
of this study, a former Commissioner of DPH, opined that "no more
than half a dozen ten taxpayer groups could reasonably be conceived of
as representing consumer and broad community interests"'' during
the period he served as Commissioner.
Analysis of the participation of ten-taxpayer groups in all DON
project applications (not only hospital applications) since 1974 suggests
a more discrete classification of the groups. 102 It appears that ten-tax-
payer interventions fall into four primary categories:
(a) AdHoc Groups. Of the 260 ten-taxpayer groups participating
in the period under study, 89, or 34.2%, were considered as falling into
the ad hoc category. These are groups formed by individuals without
evident institutional ties or financial involvement with the applicant or
competing applicants. Generally, the position of such groups is nega-
tive: many were formed, for example, to oppose half-way houses or
abortion clinics in their neighborhoods. Those groups intervening in
97. Bicknell & Van Wyck, supra note 24, at 57.
98. Id
99. Id
100. I d at 54.
101. Id
102. The analysis of ten-taxpayer interventions at the DPH proceedings level is based on an
examination of DON files undertaken by Thomas Lewis, J.D., staff attorney at the Center for Law
and Health Sciences, Boston University School of Law. The typology used in the text was devised
by Mr. Lewis. A detailed report on Mr. Lewis' analysis of the ten-taxpayer group intervention in
DPH proceedings is to appear in The American Journal of Law and Medicine.
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DON applications for hospital projects evidenced concern about the
impact on the local community of proposed major building projects.
These groups tend to evolve spontaneously with single issue con-
cerns. Because of their genesis, they do not develop technical sophisti-
cation in the substance or law relating to DON and ordinarily are not
able to develop and maintain positions that provide assistance to the
DPH staff or the Public Health Council in arriving at decisions based
on the application of general policies. They are not concerned with the
broader policy objectives of the DPH or the DON process, although
they may employ the terminology of cost containment to support their
single issue objectives.
The ad hoc groups do, however, represent legitimate grass-root
concerns and may be viewed as reflecting general community interests
in particular applications. While, therefore, their participation in DON
appears to be consistent with the original purpose of including ten-tax-
payer group intervention rights in the statute, 0 3 ad hoc groups cannot
be viewed as providing a natural constituency for the cost containment
objectives of DON. Indeed, their support of the program's objectives is
presumably no greater than the DPH's willingness to support their
opinions about a particular project application.
(b) Community Organizations. These ten-taxpayer groups arise
from already established community organizations and therefore ap-
proach the specific issues involved in a DON project application from
the perspective of the parent group's broader community objectives. It
is estimated that about 23 of the 260 ten-taxpayer group interventions,
or 8.8%, during the period under study were in this category. Most of
these groups, because of their on-going character, have acquired a de-
gree of expertise in dealing with governmental agencies generally not
possessed by ad hoc groups. Moreover, many have legal representa-
tion. Consequently, the points they raise tend to be tailored to the
DON process. These groups also have sufficient sophistication to ap-
preciate the necessity of developing arguments invoking issues of cost-
effectiveness, adequacy of planning and avoidance of duplication of fa-
cilities or services. Ordinarily, such groups will play on the Public
Health Council's emphasis on community participation by alleging in-
adequate consultation between the applicant and the group's parent or-
ganization. In a number of cases, this has led to a delay in the
processing of the application pending such consultation.
103. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
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It appears, however, that ten-taxpayer groups in this category may
often use a DON application to support objectives unrelated to the pur-
poses of the application itself. For example, a Community Action Pro-
gram established a ten-taxpayer intervention in the application process
of a local hospital seeking to purchase a radiotherapy simulator and to
renovate its radiology unit. The group alleged inadequate consultation
by the hospital with the community's poor and Hispanic populations.
By virtue of the intervention, the group obtained the hospital's agree-
ment to extend outreach programs to those populations, as well as to
publicize the availability of free care pursuant to Hill-Burton program
requirements. While the group's objectives were valuable, and cer-
tainly reflected the needs and desires of a significant segment of the
local community, once these specific objectives were obtained, the
group dropped its objections and endorsed the hospital's application. 1
04
Community organizations, then, have developed skills in using the
available statutory machinery to further their specific objectives. Not
only are these objectives not intended to effectuate any cost contain-
ment policies inherent in DON, but to the extent they involve efforts to
extend hospital services, they may be cost-producing. 05 As noted
above with respect to the ad hoc groups, the community organizations
do reflect "grass-roots" and public interest concerns, but because of the
specificity of their objectives in intervening in the DON process, they
do not provide a natural constituency to further general support for the
program.
(c) Financially Sef-Interested Groups. A number of groups in-
tervene because they have direct financial stakes in the outcome of the
review process. If approval were to be granted, they would suffer an
economic harm. Ordinarily, these groups retain counsel and invoke
considerations of cost-effectiveness and health planning to further their
point of view. Rarely do they make a clear and direct statement of
their financial interest, but their interest is usually perceived during the
course of the application process.10 6 Only 5 of 260 interventions, or
104. See DPH DON files, Application of Salem Hospital, No. 6-2646, and intervention of
North Shore Community Action Program. See also Application of Lawrence General Hospital,
No. 3-2647, and intervention of ten-taxpayer group chaired by Isabel Melendez.
105. In Application of Salem Hospital, No. 6-2646, the Hospital agreed to develop community
outreach programs. In Application of Lawrence General Hospital, the Hospital agreed to estab-
lish a primary care clinic for the community.
106. A rare example of an explicit statement of financial self-interest on the part of an inter-
vening ten-taxpayer group occurred with respect to the application of the Massachusetts General
Hospital to build an Ambulatory Care Center, No. 6-2434. Many MGH physicians, who would
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1.9%, during the period of the study, can reliably be categorized as in-
volving financially self-interested groups.
(d) Institutional "Front" Groups. While it is difficult precisely
to identify them as such, a number of groups appear to be fostered by
the applicant institution specifically for purposes of supporting the ap-
plication. When the subject matter of the application has no direct im-
pact on the delivery of health care, for example, a request to acquire
new research equipment, it may be presumed that intervening groups
have been developed by the institution. In at least one case, a ten-
taxpayer group used stationery that bore the name of the hospital
whose application it was supporting. 1°7 For the period under study,
142 of the 260 interventions, or 54.6%, have been, somewhat arbitrarily,
included within this category. Of the 142, however, 135, or 52% of all
ten-taxpayer interventions, were by groups formed to support a single
project, a proposed parking garage. 1
8
A review of the categorization and intervention objectives of ten-
taxpayer groups suggests that they have been used largely to pursue
particular community or local interests. Only rarely, if at all, have they
attempted to further a general public interest in facility planning or
cost containment. Because of the defined interest for which each inter-
venes, none of the categories of the ten-taxpayer groups represents a
stable constituency available to the DPH in support of general program
objectives, nor is any one of them therefore likely to have an impact on
the broad goals or structure of DON, as opposed to the impact they can
be expected to have on features of outcomes of specific applications.
While, therefore, the perceived statutory objective of an enhanced
"consumer" or "public" role 09 has been served by the availability of
this mechanism, it appears to have had only a marginal impact on at-
taining general DON program objectives. As with participation in
RSC public hearings, one of the reasons for less informed and con-
move into the proposed facility if constructed, were renting office space from an adjoining office
and residential complex, the Charles River Park. The developer of the Park formed an interven-
ing group, the Charles River Park Group. DPH's file on the application contains a letter of Octo-
ber 2, 1975 from the Group's attorney, who stated that "Charles River Park first became involved
• . . out of substantial concerns for.., loss of tenants from its professional office space." The
Group, however, argued against the application on the basis of cost-effectiveness.
107. See DPH DON files, Intervention of Chelsea-Revere-East Boston-Winthrop Task Force,
George Tyson, Chairman, in Application of Massachusetts General Hospital-Chelsea Health
Center, No. 4-2657.
108. See DPH DON files, Application of Winchester Hospital, No. 3-2548. The transcript of
the PHC meeting on this application, held February 24, 1976, noted that there were 135 groups
intervening in support, but no addresses were provided.
109. See text accompanying notes 66 & 103 supra.
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structive use of the ten-taxpayer interventions may derive from the
availability of other mechanisms to provide DPH with more "expert"
information, specifically the statutory right of participation by HSAs.1 0
Although no systematic study has yet been undertaken of the role of
HSAs in the DON process in Massachusetts, one can reasonably specu-
late that many of the persons technically knowledgeable about the op-
erations and objectives of the DON program, and sympathetic to its
health planning and system restructuring goals, are likely to participate
in the HSA review and comment process.
B. Political Opposition to Cost Containment Programs
Another method for determining whether provisions for public
participation have produced general support for the objectives of DON
and Chapter 409 involves consideration of the political opposition to
the programs, that is, the extent to which such political opposition has
developed, and its effectiveness in undercutting program objectives or
decisions. While political opposition may take many forms, one of the
most dramatic and most likely to be effective is a legislative effort to
modify or override the program. When opposition reaches the level of
affirmative legislative action to intervene, it may be presumed that dis-
affection with the program is extensive and that the program has not
been able to develop countervailing political support. Analysis of legis-
lative responses to the cost containment programs reveals clear differ-
ences between DON and Chapter 409.
The original DON legislation in Massachusetts derived from com-
peting bills initially submitted by the governor and the Massachusetts
Hospital Association."' At a point in the legislative process when it
was felt that no bill would be enacted, however, a legislative committee
produced its own version and ushered it to enactment as an emergency
act. 2 A special legislative committee was then authorized to develop
permanent legislation, and the DON bill finally enacted was almost
entirely a product of that committee." 13 Thus, both the decision to en-
110. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I 1, §§ 25C, E, G (Law. Co-op 1975).
111. See Commonwealth of Massachusetts, General Court, S. Docs. 1016 and 1453; H. Doc.
6125 (1971). See also Interim Report of the Joint Special Committee, supra note 22, at 3.
112. Law of Nov. 15, 1971, ch. 1080, 1971 Mass. Acts 1074. See Interim Report of the Joint
Special Committee, supra note 22, at 3.
113. See generally Interim Report of the Joint Special Committee, supra note 22. Certain
amendments were added to the Committee's proposal by the House and some were incorporated
into the final Conference Committee version of the bill, which became Law of July 18, 1972, ch.
776, 1972 Mass. Acts 721. The amendments, however, did not go to the scope of the program, but
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act a DON program and the structure of the program may be consid-
ered results of legislative, not executive or nongovernmental, initiative.
It would therefore be reasonable to expect strong legislative support for
the program.
This initial legislative support for the program did not, however,
prevent the legislature on five occasions through the 1977 session from
passing special bills for the purpose of overriding DPH decisions unfa-
vorable to applicant hospitals. All five bills were vetoed by the gover-
nor, but all but one of the vetoes were overridden.I 4 Three of the bills
ultimately enacted over the governor's veto affected relatively small in-
stitutions with strong community ties." 5 Indeed, two of the three were
municipally owned. i16 It may be inferred that in all three cases it was a
matter of political significance to the local representatives and senators
that the affected hospital be supported, and that members of the legisla-
ture responded to this situation of political necessity with empathy.
The fourth bill enacted over the governor's veto supported a Catholic
institution, was endorsed by the Archidocese, and was, not surprisingly,
approved by a strongly Catholic legislature.
The only one of these bills not ultimately enacted related to the
New England Baptist Hospital, a teaching hospital in Boston with no
particularly strong ties to the local community. The proposed project
was also the largest of the five in dollar terms. The absence of an orga-
nized constituency in the community to support the hospital, coupled
with the magnitude of the project, permitted discussion to focus prima-
rily on the cost implication of the special bill, not on community pride
or other such factors.' 17
The validity of these statutory overrides of specific DON decisions
by DPH was the subject of an action for declaratory judgment brought
related primarily to the DPH's capacity to assess application fees, the organizational structure of
the Public Health Council, and the scope of review of the Health Facilities Appeals Board.
114. See Law of Oct. 17, 1973, ch. 923, 1973 Mass. Acts 935 (Bessie M. Burke Memorial
Hospital); Law of Nov. 19, 1973, ch. 1053, 1973 Mass. Acts 1092 (Winchendon Hospital); Law of
Nov. 9, 1977, ch. 721, 1977 Mass. Acts 873 (Amesbury Hospital); Law of Jan. 3, 1978, ch. 907,
1977 Mass. Acts 1262 (St. John of God Hospital); House Doe. 2960 (1977) (New England Baptist
Hospital) (passed by both Houses but vetoed by Governor; veto sustained). See also Law of July
22, 1974, ch. 583, 1974 Mass. Acts 561 (Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hospital).
115. The institutions affected were Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hospital, Winchendon Hospital
and Amesbury Hospital.
116. The institutions were Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hospital (Lawrence) and Amesbury
Hospital (Amesbury).
117. See BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 1; id., Jan. 9, 1978, at 12, col. 1; id., Dec. 18,
1977, at 6, col. 1 (criticizing special bills, particularly one approving a $30 million project for the
New England Baptist Hospital, for undermining the state's cost control efforts).
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by the Commissioner of Public Health. In that suit, Commissioner of
Public Health v. Bessie M. Burke Memorial Hospital, 8 the Commis-
sioner alleged that the legislative actions constituted violations of arti-
cles 10 and 30 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts
Constitution.1 9 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ulti-
mately upheld the legislative actions. With respect to the article 10
challenge, the court noted that earlier construction of the relevant con-
stitutional language established the proposition that "'the Legislature
has no power to suspend the operation of a general law in favor of an
individual,' "120 although it was evident that the court "'has often up-
held special legislation.' "12 The court resolved this apparent conflict
by interpreting article 10's proscription to apply only to situations in
which benefits to the person singled out were
accompanied by corresponding injury to another person who can be
definitely pointed to .... [AIrt. 10 appears not to forbid a special or
private act which, while assisting an individual, does not by its oper-
ation diminish or defeat an existing property interest of any other
individual, or do other injury to him.
22
The court upheld the special acts "because they [were] not shown
to do injury to the interest of any individual or entity." 21 Perhaps rec-
ognizing the implications of its decision under the circumstances, the
court chose not to give weight to the policies underlying the original
departmental actions:
There is a sense in which excessive or misguided construction and
subsequent inefficient utilization of health care facilities may cast
needless expense on the members of the public who foot the bill in
the long run, and other adverse consequences to the public can be
imagined, but these results, if they should eventuate, are not specific
harms to identifiable persons with which art. 10 is concerned 24
The court left open the possibility that, if competitive applicants
were disadvantaged by such special acts, then article 10's proscription
could be activated. Apparently only under that circumstance could the
added societal cost associated with unneeded construction rise to the
level of a legally cognizable injury.
There is an irony here, some of whose significance is explored in a
118. 366 Mass. 734, 323 N.E.2d 309 (1975).
119. MASS. CONsT. arts. 10, 30.
120. 366 Mass. at 742, 323 N.E.2d at 314.
121. Id
122. Id at 743, 323 N.E.2d at 314.
123. Id at 744, 323 N.E.2d at 315.
124. Id at 744-45, 323 N.E.2d at 315.
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different context below. 125 Health insurance and governmental benefit
programs were developed primarily to insulate citizens from the direct
impact of hospital costs by spreading that financial burden across soci-
ety through taxes and insurance. Yet, from the court's perspective, the
availability of such risk spreading precludes otherwise appropriate par-
ties from overturning special interest legislation that has the effect of
increasing the overall cost burden to society. Arguably, if the citizens
of the hospitals' service areas were still obliged to pay directly for their
hospital care, instead of having the costs covered by insurance or gov-
ernmental benefit programs, and it could be demonstrated that addi-
tional hospital investment increased the price of those services, then the
requisite "harm to identifiable persons" would be established.
The court's analysis of the separation of powers issue under article
30 was substantially identical to its interpretation of article 10.
The substantial question is whether the legislative enactment itself
which dictates a given result involves an improper intrusion on the
functions of another branch. This is a problem to be examined on
the facts, and seems to us to turn at least in civil matters on whether
that enactment infringes on proprietary rights or does other specific
injury, so that the issue here is much like that under art. 10.16
In upholding the special acts, the court asserted its neutrality on
the knotty qestion of the legitimacy of decisions rendered by DPH, but
implied the propriety of using the legislature as a means of establishing
"equity" in the administration of the DON program.
It is not for us to indicate a judgment as to whether a course such as
that taken by the Legislature ... is merely a conspicuous invitation
to log rolling or, on the contrary, an understandable and even necessary
means of introducing an occasional equity into a general statutory
scheme .. . It is enough to say that legislative choices that were
made in the present case cannot be assumed by us on the present
record to have been against "the good and welfare."'
27
Following the 1977 session, the Massachusetts Legislature has con-
tinued to enact bills overriding DON decisions rendered by the DPH.
As of September 1979, a number of such bills are awaiting gubernato-
rial action. While the DPH generally has opposed such override legis-
lation, its main line of response has entailed the institution of
procedural reforms of the DON process itself that served to deflect dis-
satisfaction with substantive decisions made by the DPH. Its theory
125. See text accompanying notes 178-199 infra.
126. 366 Mass. at 746, 323 N.E.2d at 316.
127. Id at 750, 323 N.E.2d at 318 (emphasis added).
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may be that political opposition to the program resulted not from oppo-
sition to the objectives of the program but from unhappiness about the
length of time it took the DPH to process a project to conclusion and to
reach a decision, and the uncertainty on the part of an applicant about
the standards and criteria by which its proposed project could be evalu-
ated. The inference is that it was believed that improved procedures
and procedural rules could deflect political attacks on the program.
Acting on this presumed perception, both the DPH and the legisla-
ture initiated efforts to improve the DON process. Following enact-
ment of the 1973 special bills, the DPH developed and promulgated
amendments to the DON regulations "intended to improve the respon-
siveness of the process, to speed the processing of routine applications
as well as making more explicit the criteria to be used by the Public
Health Council in approving or denying applications."' 8 In 1977, at
the time the second group of special acts were under discussion, general
amendments to the DON statute were adopted, requiring, for example,
a shortened time period to process applications and mandating that ap-
plications be judged according to pre-established standards and crite-
ria." 9 At the same time, efforts were undertaken to develop more
explicit criteria to be employed in DON reviews.'
3
1
The 1977 amendments were, as indicated, predominantly in the
nature of procedural reforms. With one exception they cannot be eas-
ily construed as attacks on the integrity of the objectives of the underly-
ing regulatory program, although they did place a premium on an
efficient processing of applications by the DPH.131 The one exception
related to the exemption from the DON program of certain research
128. See Bicknell & Van Wyck, supra note 24, at 11. See also Bicknell & Walsh, Certocation.
of-Need" The Massachusetts Experience, 292 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1054, 1059-1060 (1975).
129. Law of Jan. 9, 1978, ch. 945, 1977 Mass. Acts 1363 (codified at MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 6A,
§ 35; id. ch. Ill, §§ 25B, 25C, 25F, 25H (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978)).
130. See Mass. DON Regs., supra note 29, at pts. 60-65.
131. For example, the statutes now provide that DPH shall
approve or disapprove in whole or in part. . .[an] application for a determination of
need within eight months after filing with the department; provided that the department
may, on one occasion only, delay such action for up to two months after the applicant
has provided information which the department reasonably has requested during such
eight month period. Applications remanded to the department [by the HFAB under
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 25E (Law. Co-op 1975)] shall be acted upon ... within the
same time limits. . . . Any application which has not been acted upon by the depart-
ment within such time limits shall be deemed to have been approved.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 25C (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978). By contrast, the section origi-
nally provided that DPH "shall approve or disapprove, in whole or in part, or otherwise act upon
every such application in a timely manner, but in any event within one hundred and twenty days
after filing." Law of July 18, 1972, ch. 776, § 3, 1972 Mass. Acts 724 (emphasis added).
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and teaching projects undertaken by hospitals.' 32 There too, though,
the legislature appears to have made an effort to retain the cost contain-
ment objectives of the basic program by excluding from the exemption
research and teaching programs whose costs would have an impact on
patient care charges.'
33
The efforts at procedural reform, as noted earlier, have not pre-
cluded further legislative overrides. The reform strategy may have
failed, in part, because of the change of administration in Massachu-
setts in January 1979, and indications that the new governor would
take a strong anti-regulatory stance.
Administration of the Chapter 409 program, unlike that of DON,
has been relatively free of political controversy, at least as measured by
legislative opposition. 34 It is instructive to speculate on why this is so.
At least two factors may help account for the differences in reaction:
the capacity of the RSC to employ a "formula" approach to imple-
menting Chapter 409, and the gradualist or incrementalist philosophy
embodied in the Chapter 409 statute. Each of these factors is described
briefly below.
1. The Use of a Formula Approach To Ratesetting
The regulatory approach taken by the RSC involves two charac-
teristics. First, it has been limited, at least to date, to relatively tradi-
tional cost analysis and does not attempt directly in the review process
to incorporate less quantifiable considerations, such as quality or need.
From this follows the second characteristic, which is the system's ca-
pacity to reduce operating principles used for developing allowable
costs, revenues and charges, to definitional or mathematical formulae
applied to historic and budgeted cost data.' 35 The regulations gov-
erning the system define elements of cost, identify factors to be recog-
nized in permitting changes in the hospitals' cost structure, and
132. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 25C (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
133. Id Among the conditions attached by the statute to permit an exemption from the re-
quired DON review for research and teaching purposes is the requirement that "the cost of such
expenditure or change shall cause no increase in the total patient care charges of the [applicant]
facility to the public. . ., as such charges shall be defined from time to time. . . [by the RSC
under Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Acts 529]." On the subject of this exemption,
see Friedman, Federal Preclusion ofState Certificate-of-Need Exemptionsfor Research and Educa-
tion Expenditures, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 91 (1978).
134. Organized opposition to Chapter 409 has taken the form of direct judicial challenge, not
legislative amendment. See Affiliated Hosps. Cent., Inc. v. Weiner, No. 22824 (Suffolk Sup. Ct.
1978); Affiliated Hosp. Cent., Inc. v. Weiner, No. 19457 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. 1977).
135. For examples of the types of formulae employed, see Massachusetts Rate Setting Com-
mission Regulation 114.1 C.M.R. § 8.00 (1978).
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establish formulae for quantifying those factors in analyzing an indi-
vidual hospital's experience.
An important feature of the formula approach is that it does not
vest much discretion in individual staff members of the agency, or even
in the Commissioners themselves, to vary the rules or make personal
equitable judgments in individual cases. This is in contrast, for exam-
ple, with budget negotiation systems in which there is an absence of
explicitly established rules and many discretionary decisions are made
during the review of a particular budget. 3 6 On the other hand, a
formula approach may be unduly rigid and insensitive to genuine equi-
table needs arising in unique or unusual circumstances. The formula
approach does, however, have a significant advantage in removing pol-
icy formulation from individualized and highly discretionary personal
judgments and placing it at the point at which regulations incorporat-
ing the formulae are developed and promulgated. A number of bene-
fits accrue to the RSC from this reliance on a rulemaking approach:
First, judicial review is ordinarily sought as an attack on the regu-
lation, not on the specific application of the regulation. In defending
itself, the RSC enjoys the presumption in favor of its action in imple-
menting its statutory authority. 137 This posture contrasts with that of
other ratesetting programs that rely on negotiations with hospitals and
informal guidelines developed for application during the negotiation
process. 1
38
Second, rules of general applicability are developed with sufficient
specificity to minimize agency discretion and are then applied consist-
ently to all providers. The result is that hospitals generally feel that
they have been treated fairly, that is, consistently, in the process. This
"perception of fairness" may be a prerequisite for avoiding substantive
as well procedural attacks on a regulatory program.
Finally, reliance on rulemaking moves complaints about the proc-
ess away from individual decisions to the more distant, technical, and
abstract rulemaking process itself. Use of rulemaking and the develop-
136. For a description and discussion of these approaches, see Danbury Hosp. v. Commission
on Hosps. and Health Care, No. 18958 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Fairfield County, Conn. 1978);
New Britain Gen. Hosp. v. Commission on Hosps. and Health Care, No. 13 24 86-1 (Ct. of Com-
mon Pleas, Hartford County, Conn. 1977); Franklin Square Hosp. v. Health Serv. Cost Review
Comm'n, No. 82047 (Baltimore County Ct., Md. 1975).
137. See Affiliated Hosps. Cent., Inc. v. Weiner, No. 22824, at 24-25 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. 1978).
138. See Danbury Hosp. v. Commission on Hosps. and Health Care, No. 18958 (Ct. of Com-
mon Pleas, Fairfield County, Conn. 1978); New Britain Gen. Hosp. v. Commission on Hosps. and
Health Care, No. 13 24 86-1 (Ct. of Common Pleas, Hartford County, Conn. 1977); Franklin
Square Hosp. v. Health Serv. Cost Review Comm'n, No. 82047 (Baltimore County Ct., Md. 1975).
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ment of technically complex formulae make it difficult to identify an
effective time at which to mobilize opposition to the program. To the
extent that the rules are technical, most potential opponents would find
it difficult to build support on the basis of dimly perceived policy impli-
cations that are being attacked. To the extent explicit rules are applied
consistently, opponents cannot rely on inequitable administration as a
political lever for change or as a legal argument.
In contrast to the Chapter 409 program, the DON program has not
enjoyed reliance on technical formulae and rulemaking. The enabling
act contains language that could permit reduction of rules governing
decisionmaking to mathematical constructs,139 but until relatively re-
cently such an effort has not been made on a significant scale.141 In
ordinary language, "need" is a highly subjective concept that must be
analyzed by examining a multiplicity of factors. The RSC limits itself
to cost analysis, whereas the DPH cannot so restrict its scope of inquiry
but must of necessity venture into a variety of subjective or discretion-
ary areas of evaluation.' 4' Some but not all of the relevant factors can
be reduced to mathematical precision for purposes of evaluation. Even
relatively precise guidelines, however, will often leave much discretion
with the agency concerning their application in specific circumstances.
In such situations, if the agency does not articulate clearly the reasons
for a particular decision, or fails to develop a set of "common law"
principles enabling it to identify consistent lines among different out-
comes,142 an individual decision may be challenged as unfair, inequita-
ble or inconsistent with treatment provided to similar applicants.
Further, in the absence of reliance on rulemaking, policies or interpre-
tations may change from one application to another, but the agency
may have no formal capacity to notify applicants of the changes. This
139. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. I 11, § 25C (Law. Co-op 1975).
140. See text accompanying notes 43 & 129 supra.
141. See, e.g., Bachman, Health Planning-The Next Step, 3 HEALTH L. PROJECT BULL. 1
(1978); Bicknell & Walsh, supra note 128, at 1059; Bovbjerg, Problems and Prospectsfor Health
Planning: The Importance ofIncentives, Standards, and Procedures in Certyfcate of Need, 1978
UTAH L. REV. 83, 90-97. See also Schonbrun, Making Cert4cate of Need Work, this Symposium,
at text accompanying notes 27 & 28, 93-101.
142. The DPH staff has, on a number of occasions, considered undertaking a detailed analysis
of Public Health Council minutes and records to determine the operative rules and factors that
actually structured the decisions on DON applications and developing, in effect, a common law
approach toward applicable rules. Conversations with David Rosenberg, DPH General Counsel,
1973, and with Jacob Getson, Director, Office of State Health Planning, DPH, 1979. Such an
approach would constitute an alternative or supplement to the standards and criteria development
process described in the text accompanying notes 83 & 84 supra.
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may enhance the feeling of unfairness on the part of the subject
hospitals.
The subjectivity of the definition of "need" complicates the politi-
cal life of a DON agency in another respect. DON applications are
ordinarily the product of an internal decisionmaking process in which
the hospital itself proceeds to identify and respond to community need.
When an application is filed, the regulatory agency must reassess that
need determination process and place it in the context of its statewide
policies and objectives, rather than merely those of the institution or
even the local community. Consequently, very different perceptions of
"need" may be at play, and an adverse regulatory decision may not be
accepted when the local community feels that the individual hospital
actually does have an accurate perception of its "need."
2. Gradualism
Both DON and ratesetting are relatively new regulatory programs.
The sophistication of the analytic techniques available to support their
decisions is still in an early state of development. 143 When a regulatory
program must rely on an evolving technical state of the art, a number
of strategic options are available: regulatory authority may be withheld
until the analytic support for reasoned and consistent decisions is avail-
able; general regulatory authority may be established, but certain
classes of decisions may be precluded pending further analytic develop-
ments; or the inadequacy of the underlying techniques may be ignored,
so that an agency may be required to render regulatory decisions even
absent adequate or generally accepted technical grounds.'
4
DON in Massachusetts, at least until the 1977 amendments, 41 fol-
lowed the third option. Although the DPH was given extensive DON
authority in the 1971 and 1972 enactments, at the time very little in the
way of standards and criteria for evaluating need had been developed,
143. HEW is, for example, currently funding major evaluation studies of certificate of need
and ratesetting programs in a number of states. The certificate of need study is being undertaken
by Urban Systems Planning and Engineering, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., and that of ratesetting pro-
grams by Abt Associates, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.
144. See Weiner, State Regulation and Health Care Technology, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE
QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE 218-221 (Egdahl & Gertman eds. 1978). An excellent example of the
difficulties posed for reviewing courts where agencies make decisions under the circumstances
described in the text appears in the various opinions and statements regarding the appropriate
scope and standards for judicial review by members of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1976).
145. See text accompanying notes 131 & 132 supra.
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and very little analytical work had been undertaken to develop stan-
dards and criteria that could generally be accepted as valid for imple-
mentation in a DON program. Indeed, the major incentive for
developing such standards and criteria did not occur until 1975, with
enactment of the National Health Planning and Resources Develop-
ment Act.' 46 Thus, much of the history of the DON program after
1971, and especially after 1975, entailed efforts to develop specific ana-
lytic techniques and an effective health planning process to provide a
basis of support for DON decisions. Absent these efforts, little ground
existed for explaining individual decisions in a broader context, for
identifying consistencies in decisions, or for acceptance of the DPH's
"expertise" in administering the program.
In contrast, the drafters of Chapter 409 recognized the evolution-
ary nature of ratesetting and structured the statute in line with that
recognition. The approach taken was not a blanket authorization to
the RSC to undertake charge or budget control. Such an approach
might have generated unrealistic expectations concerning the RSC's ca-
pacity to administer a fully effective program. Had such an expectation
forced the RSC to initiate a more ambitious program than that of
which it was technically capable, the program would likely have
proved a disaster.
Instead of a sudden and sweeping mandate, Chapter 409 reflected
a philosophy of starting with what was known and building gradually.
Techniques for the control of rates of increase, such as inflation projec-
tions and volume adjustment formulae, were familiar to most Massa-
chusetts hospitals through their participating agreement with Blue
Cross, 4 7 and through some of the conceptual developments in the later
stages of the federal economic stabilization program.148 The hospitals
were also used to working with Medicare's definition of cost.149 Thus,
Chapter 409 relied in its first years of implementation on a definition of
"total patient care costs" tied to Medicare's definition of allowable cost
categories, 15  and on analytic techniques already familiar in the
146. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k, 300t (1976)).
147. See Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., Participating Hospital Agreement HA-25-TH, art.
IV, § 4, at 18-22 (1973).
148. See 6 C.F.R. §§ 150.705-.706 (1974).
149. Medicare's definitions of cost allowable for reimbursement under the program are set
forth at 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.401-.488 (1977).
150. Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Acts 522. See also Affiliated Hosps. Cent.,
Inc. v. Weiner, No. 22824, at 22-31 (Suffolk Sup. Ct. 1978).
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state.151 The statute identified specific gaps in the system, such as the
eventual inadequacy of the Medicare definition in the context of a
budget control program 52 and the need to incorporate analyses of cur-
rent or base year cost levels through techniques of comparing the costs
of like institutions. 1
53
Finally, Chapter 409 required the RSC to address these gaps over
a period sufficiently long to permit the development of viable analytical
approaches, which were then to be incorporated into the control sys-
tem. Chapter 409 became effective on October 15, 1976. The RSC was
directed to revise the definition of "total patient care cost" by October
1, 1978,154 and to develop a methodology for grouping hospitals for
comparative purposes by October 1, 1979.11 Behind this approach was
the desire to enhance the agency's competence to handle more sophisti-
cated techniques before they were actually employed in a regulatory
decisionmaking process.
Other examples of this gradualist approach appeared in specific
administrative decisions made by the agency during the early phases of
implementation. These included the decision to continue use of tradi-
tional hospital charge schedules instead of requiring a standard pay-
ment unit. 156 A similar philosophy underlay the RSC's sensitivity to
the appropriate allocation of decisionmaking responsibilities between
itself as a public agency and the hospital as a private institution. Thus,
for example, principal emphasis in the Chapter 409 program is on de-
velopment of a "bottom line" amount representing maximum allowa-
ble revenue available to the hospital annually. 57 Expenditure of this
allowable revenue is not rigidly allocated to individual departments or
line items. In effect, the hospital management was expected to make its
151. For example, MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 6A, § 37 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978) allows the
RSC to approve a modification in charge proposed by a hospital if "the increase proposed is
consistent with the rate of inflation in the economy generally, as measured by a composite price
index to be specified in such regulations [of the RSC] and based, to the extent practicable, on any
index approved by the commission and contained in [Blue Cross agreements approved by the
RSC under id ch. 176A, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1977)]."
152. See Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Laws 522.
153. See MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 6A, § 40 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
154. Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Laws 522.
155. MAss. STAT. ANN. ch. 6A, § 40 (Law Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978).
156. See Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission Regulation, 14 C.H.S.R. § 4 (1975).
157. Massachusetts law provides that the RSC "shall approve or disapprove in whole or in
part only the total patient care costs and total patient care charges projected by the applicant or
filing hospital." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 6A, § 40 (Law. Co-op Cum. Supp. 1978) (emphasis ad-
ded). The implication is that approval goes to the total figures and not to any departmental break-
down that may be used in constructing the aggregate figures. 'Total patient care costs" and "total
patient care charges" are defined in Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Acts 522.
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own decisions concerning the use of available financial resources, so
long as the "bottom line" was not exceeded.
This gradualist approach also meant, of course, that the system
would become increasingly rigorous over time, with its full potential
impact being deferred for some years. It may be likely, therefore, that
political opposition to the program has been deferred, with hospitals
adopting a wait and see attitude while the additional elements of the
program are developing. And, indeed, some of the RSC's approaches
to satisfying the statutory mandate have already generated significant
concern and opposition from hospitals. 58 With the full operation of
the program scheduled for October 1, 1979, (with the addition of the
technique for comparing hospitals) bills have now been introduced into
the 1979 session of the legislature, supported by the Hospital Associa-
tion or other hospital representatives, to modify or defer portions of the
Chapter 409 enabling act. 59 The current session of the legislature may
provide some evidence on the question whether, despite the different
approaches to decisionmaking taken by DON and Chapter 409, they
may nonetheless both be equally subject to significant and effective po-
litical opposition.
158. For example, in March 1978, the RSC circulated publicly an issues paper concerning the
definition of "reasonable financial requirements" that it was to adopt by October 1, 1978, pursuant
to Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Acts 529. See Financial Requirements Under
Chapter 409-Background and Issues. The paper was presented at a series of public hearings held
for hospital trustees, administrators and financial staffs in March and April of 1978. Among other
matters, the paper dealt with possible uses of hospital restricted and unrestricted income and char-
itable contributions in the budget review and approval process. The hospital response to sugges-
tions in the paper that nonpatient sources of revenue might be used in defining "reasonable
financial requirements" was strongly negative. See, e.g., MASSACHUSETTS HOSPITAL ASSOCIA-
TION, THE ROLE OF RATE SET-rING, FINANCIAL REQUIREMENTS, AND STATE HEALTH POLICY IN
YOUR HOSPITAL (1978); NEW ENGLAND ASSOCIATION FOR HOSPITAL DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE
OF PHILANTHROPY IN MASSACHUSETTS HOSPITALS: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE RATE SETTING
COMMISSION, COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS (1979).
H. No. 3466, which was introduced into the 1979 session of the Massachusetts legislature,
proposes to preclude use by the RSC of unrestricted and restricted income in calculating charges
or approving budgets. The Joint Legislative Committee on Health Care has voted approval of the
bill.
159. H. No. 3466 (1979) proposes to preclude use by the RSC of unrestricted and restricted
income in calculating charges or approving budgets. See note 158 supra. H. No. 3478 (1979)
would defer imposition by the RSC of uniform reporting requirements pending federal develop-
ment of uniform reporting regulations. H. No. 3479 (1979) would delay the requirement of Chap-
ter 409 that the RSC develop a methodology for grouping hospitals until uniform reporting
requirements are established. The Joint Legislative Committee on Health Care, in April 1979,
voted to support H. No. 3466 and to reject H. No. 3478 and H. No. 3479.
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IV. FACTORS SUGGESTING LACK OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR COST
CONTAINMENT
A. Introduction
The analyses undertaken in the preceding section suggest some
tentative conclusions. First, there may be only limited circumstances in
which the capacity for general public participation in the cost contain-
ment regulatory process may be effective. Such circumstances involve
a combination of two elements: a structured opportunity for diverse
interest groups to participate and possession by the group of a rela-
tively high level of technical expertise. Thus, the analysis suggests that
the RSC Advisory Council has not been successful, either in changing
RSC positions or in providing support for its program objectives,
whereas the Hospital Policy Review Board has been an effective
participant.
Second, the availability of extensive opportunities for public par-
ticipation in agency proceedings is not correlated with effective political
support for agency programs. Despite substantial opportunities for
general public and interest group involvement in the review of DON
applications, the program was not able to withstand political attacks
culminating in legislative overrides of specific decisions.' 60 While the
RSC has not yet been subject to equivalent political difficulties, it is not
yet certain whether similar openness in the Chapter 409 process will
provide useful support to the RSC in the face of intensified hospital
opposition. Further, the possibility for participation in such proceed-
ings, except perhaps when they are highly structured, as in the case of
the Hospital Policy Review Board, has not provided a mechanism for
the regulatory agencies to undertake public education to develop
support.
Third, other procedural issues may be more significant in deter-
mining the effectiveness of political opposition to the regulatory pro-
gram than the question of who may participate in the agency's
decisionmaking process. Processing time, clarity of the "rules of the
game," consistency in decisionmaking and confidence in the compe-
tence of the decisionmaker may all be more conducive to providing
political support for the program, or at least neutralizing political op-
position, than public participation in agency processes.
An evaluation of the relationship between public participation and
160. See text accompanying notes 114-127 supra.
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political support, however, must consider the nature of the constituency
groups likely to be interested in participating in a hospital cost contain-
ment agency's processes, and the political position of such groups with
respect to the agency's objectives. An implicit assumption of the fore-
going analysis has been that there were sufficient nonprovider interest
groups supportive of the agency's reformist objectives to permit the
conclusion that the agency's objectives reflected the "public interest."
But if, as it appears, the role of public participation has had relatively
little impact on the political status of the particular program, perhaps
the phenomenon is due to the very nature of the constituencies them-
selves. In short, is there any constituency group likely to provide con-
tinuing and strong support to the cost containment objectives of the
DPH in administering DON or the RSC in administering Chapter 409?
One could infer from the preceding analysis that a group's support for
a cost containment program is a function of its immediate and particu-
lar interests, not necessarily reflecting general support of program
objectives, and that cost containment is not generally viewed by the
public at large as a significant policy objective. Therefore, the willing-
ness of any particular interest group to support general program objec-
tives will last only so long as and to the extent that those objectives
directly benefit the relevant interest group. While such a conclusion is
hardly surprising, it does nonetheless suggest the tenuous nature of po-
litical support for cost containment objectives and the need for the reg-
ulatory agencies to develop clear evidence and statements concerning
the relationship between their goals and the particular interests of af-
fected groups.
Estimating potential public support for cost containment becomes
increasingly important as the Massachusetts regulatory agencies at-
tempt, on the basis of ambiguous statutory authority, to move beyond
the explicit statutory authorizations of DON and Chapter 409 to en-
courage or require mergers or closures of services and institutions.
B. Potential Constituencies for Cost Containment
A persistent question is why should a regulatory agency attempt-
ing to achieve cost containment objectives in the hospital field have
difficulty developing broad public support among nonhospital inter-
ests? A number of organized constituency groups emerge as logical
supporters of cost containment objectives: government itself, particu-
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larly as a major purchaser of hospital services through Medicare 16 1 and
Medicaid 62; insurers, who must translate hospital costs into insurance
premiums; business and labor, as groups primarily responsible for
purchasing insurance to provide financial protection against the risks of
hospitalization; and the elderly, who pay a certain portion of medical
expenses out of pocket despite Medicare. While each of these groups
represents potential supporters of cost containment, the capacity of
each to provide effective and consistent political support to the cost
containment objectives of regulatory agencies is affected by certain ba-
sic structural characteristics of the hospital delivery system - specifi-
cally the role of government, the role of insurance and the status of
hopsitals themselves. Each of these characteristics, and its impact on
potential constituencies for cost containment, is explored in the follow-
ing sections.
1. The Role of Government
The federal and state governments perform multiple functions in
the hospital delivery system. Of greatest significance for purposes of
this analysis are their responsibilities for purchasing and regulating
services. 63 Through Medicare and Medicaid, the financing of hospital
services on behalf of defined populations is shared by both levels of
government. The federal government has the greater fiscal obligation
because of the structure of Medicare' 64 and its cost sharing responsibil-
ities under Medicaid. 65 State governments are more immediately and
continuously faced with the costs of supporting Medicaid because they
must annually appropriate the full amount necessary to operate the
program, subject to reimbursement of a specified percentage from the
federal government. 66 Aside from financial responsibility, state gov-
ernment has traditionally been the primary unit for regulating hospital
services, a role reinforced by the National Health Planning and Re-
161. 42 U.S.C. § 1395F(b) (1976).
162. Id. § 1346 (1976).
163. Weiner, supra note 144, at 211-215.
164. The primary sources of payment for Medicare benefits are the Federal Hospital Trust
Fund, established by § 1817 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1976), and the Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Fund, established by § 1841 of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1395t (1976). Sources of revenue for the trust funds are payroll taxes and beneficiary
premiums.
165. Id § 1396b sets forth the provisions concerning the financial responsibility of the federal
government for Medicaid.
166. See, e.g., 44 Fed. Reg. 10,553 (1979) (setting forth the federal medical assistance percent-
age per state for the period October 1, 1979 through September 30, 1981).
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sources Development Act. 67
At least in states with large Medicaid programs, such as New York
and Massachusetts, the state's responsibility for financing hospital serv-
ices has been a major determinant of the position of its executive on
regulating the costs of those services. Both New York and Massachu-
setts originally undertook cost containment programs directly tied to
their Medicaid responsibilities, and thus attempted regulation through
the medium of financing.
68
But this approach may produce at least two potentially inequitable
effects. The first effect may be an increased differential between Medi-
caid rates and rates paid by other purchasers for the same hospital serv-
ices, with Medicaid paying less. This effect occurs because of the way
in which the payment rates for hospital services are developed. In sim-
plest terms, hospitals are paid on the basis of "cost" or "charges." Blue
Cross, Medicare and Medicaid generally develop their payment rates
on the basis of the cost figures of the particular hospital. 69 Yet the
rates for all cost-based payors for the same services are not the same
because of the different definitions of allowable cost that may be used
in drawing up rates. 7 Thus, the Medicaid program may employ a
restrictive definition to achieve cost containment objectives, whereas
Blue Cross and Medicare may use a less restrictive approach. In such a
circumstance, costs that are not recognized for Medicaid purposes are
included in developing Blue Cross and Medicare rates. The latter rates
will therefore be higher than Medicaid's. Further, the hospital's deci-
sion to incur costs that will not be reimbursed by Medicaid, but will be
paid by Blue Cross and Medicare, will be a function of the number of
patients covered by, and the proportion of hospital patient care revenue
received from, the respective programs. If Medicaid accounts for only
ten percent of hospital revenue, whereas Blue Cross and Medicare
combined account for seventy-five percent, the hospital is likely not to
structure its cost decisions based on Medicaid's principles, but rather to
167. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k-300t (1976). The Act requires that states must adopt a certificate of
need program satisfactory to the Secretary of HEW. Id. § 300m-2(a)(4)(B) (1976). The constitu-
tionality of this provision was upheld in North Carolina ex rel Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp.
532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'dment, 98 S. Ct. 1597 (1978).
168. Weiner, supra note 25, at 15-21, 24-27, 27-28 n.74.
169. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 176, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1977) (Blue Cross of Massachusetts); 42
U.S.C. § 1395f(b) (1976) (Medicare); Id. § 1396a(13)(d) (1976) (Medicaid).
170. For example, Massachusetts Medicaid and federal Medicare rates provide for straight-
line, historical cost depreciation, but until recently Massachusetts Medicaid used 50 years as the
standard building life, while Medicare uses 40. Massachusetts Blue Cross, on the other hand, uses
price level depreciation. Chapter 409 allows recognition for bad debt and free care, while Massa-
chusetts Medicaid does not. Law of Oct. 15, 1976, ch. 409, § 5, 1976 Mass. Acts 522.
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accept a loss of only approximately ten percent of that portion of its
cost not reimbursed by Medicaid.
A hospital's capacity to absorb this "Medicaid loss" is enhanced
by its freedom to raise charges. Certain classes of purchasers, specifi-
cally commercial (non-Blue Cross) and self-pay patients, pay charges
that hospitals in most states are free to establish on any basis whatso-
ever, whether or not cost-related." '7 Under such circumstances hospi-
tals are able to increase charges to offset in part the amount of the
"Medicaid loss."
Thus, because of either the differences in definitions of allowable
cost used by cost-based purchasers, or the capacity of hospitals to in-
crease charges free of regulatory controls, efforts to use Medicaid to
contain costs would produce differentials when Medicaid was paying
less than other purchasers for identical hospital services.
While such a result may be acceptable from the state's perspective
as a purchaser, it is troubling in the context of the state's general police
power responsibilities to protect the public health and welfare. By reg-
ulating only Medicaid rates, and not overall costs or charges directly,
the state is in effect increasing the price of hospital services to non-
Medicaid patients for the benefit of its own program.
The second effect may be that hospital costs are not constrained at
all. For example, under the terms of the Medicaid prospective formula
employed in Massachusetts, 72 when a particular year becomes the base
year for the rate calculation, the full Medicaid allowable costs for that
base period are recognized.' 73 As a result, the prospective formula does
not reduce the rate of increase in hospital costs, but merely defers the
impact of past increases on Medicaid rates.'74
171. See Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission Regulation, 114.1 C.M.R. § 3.00 (1978).
172. Id § 3.05(5), 3.07. Under the original prospective methodology adopted by the Massa-
chusetts Rate Setting Commission to determine Medicaid rates for in-patient hospital services, the
"base year" was the second year prior to the rate year. That is, for fiscal year 1975 rates, the base
year was fiscal year 1973. See Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission Regulations 74-1 (1974),
74-26 (1974), 14 C.M.S.R. 3 (1975). Medicare allowable costs in the base year, with certain speci.
fled exceptions, were adjusted to develop rate year allowable costs. Effective January 1, 1978, that
methodology was changed; although the second prior year continued to be defined as the base
year, allowable base year costs were adjusted by using the third prior year's costs and projecting
them forward to the base year before adjusting base year cost to develop rate year cost. The
Medicare allowable costs in the third year prior to the rate year provide a basis for developing rate
year rates. See generally Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission Regulation, 114.1 C.M.R.
§ 3.00 (1978).
173. See Testimony of Stephen M. Weiner, Chairman, Massachusetts Rate Setting Commis-
sion, before Joint Legislative Committee on Health Care, on H. 3160 (March 1976). See also
Weiner, supra note 25, at 44 n.117.
174. See Message from Governor Michael S. Dukakis to The Honorable Senate and House of
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Because of continuing increases in Medicaid expenditures, even
with its prospective formula, the state administration in Massachusetts
had the choice in 1975 of further modifying the rate formula, which
would have had the effect of further increasing the differential between
Medicaid and other rates, or shifting the basis for cost containment
strategies from reliance on purchasing responsibilities to reliance on the
general police power authority. This was the political origin of Chapter
409. The primary political support for the program came from the ad-
ministration and from the legislative Ways and Means Committees, the
members of which were concerned about Medicaid expenditures. They
saw regulation of charges and control of hospital budgets as the means
for effectively limiting Medicaid costs.1 75 Although the general societal
and economic benefits of such a program were also emphasized, 76 it
seems unlikely that the program would have been enacted in the first
place without the impetus of the Medicaid budget.
A similar development has been occurring at the federal level.
Originally, federal cost containment efforts were tied to purchasing re-
sponsibilities. 177 But increases in federal obligations for Medicare and
Medicaid moved the Carter Administration to endorse general revenue
controls, not merely controls over revenues derived from federal
sources. 178
It may be expected that the executive department's concern about
its continuing responsibility for financing hospital care will make it
particularly sensitive to the need for controlling the costs of that care
and that it will continue active efforts to foster cost containment objec-
tives. Such efforts will proceed from the dual motivation of police
power concerns about the general public good and narrower budgetary
concerns about the cost of government health care programs. Never-
Representatives, April 15, 1975, contained in H. No. 6092 (1975). Appendix C of the Governor's
Message consisted of a proposal to freeze hospital charges until June 30, 1976, and initiated the
legislative process producing Law of July 9, 1975, ch. 424, 1975 Mass. Acts 449. H. No. 6092
contained a series of bills intended to "bring the budget of the Department of Public Welfare
under control." That Department is the responsible agency for administering the state Medicaid
program. See MASs. ANN. LAWS ch. I18E (Law. Co-op 1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978). See also
Stephen M. Weiner, Chairman, Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission, Testimony in Support of
H. 6092, Appendix C, On Behalf of His Excellency, Governor Michael S. Dukakis, the Executive
Office of Human Services, and the Massachusetts Rate Setting Commission, May 27, 1975, at 3-4
[hereinafter cited as Testimony in Support of H. 60921.
175. See Testimony in Support of H. 6092, supra note 174, at 3-4.
176. Weiner, supra note 25, at 28-36.
177. H.R. 6575, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 1391, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
178. For a discussion of the impact of Medicare and Medicaid on the market for health care
services, see Posner, Regulatory Aspects of National Health Insurance Plans, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 1,
2 (1971).
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theless, because of the substantial purchasing responsibilities of govern-
ment, it it likely that the cost containment initiatives will be viewed by
affected interest groups as arising predominantly from budgetary con-
cerns. As a purchaser, the executive department of government may be
considered as no different from any other interest group acting in and
around the hospital delivery system. Its pronouncements and attitudes
will not be accorded any greater weight than those of other interests. If
its position is not viewed as generally conducive to the public good,
then, like any other interest group, it will still have to persuade other
interests to support its objectives.
Under such circumstances, that a cost containment regulatory
agency may be pursuing its objectives with the support of other execu-
tive agencies, including the chief executive, does not assure it of strong
political support. Its political efficacy will be a function of the relative
bargaining power between the executive and legislative branches, the
role of the ways and means committees within the legislature (assuming
they understand and support the link between cost containment and
budget), and the identification by other interest groups with the execu-
tive's objectives. Political support for such an agency will still then de-
pend in large measure on the willingness of other groups to support it.
The availability of that support, specifically from nonprovider interest
groups, is related to the second characteristic of the hospital delivery
system-the role of insurance.
2. The Role of Insurance
Insurance is often credited with eliminating traditional market
mechanisms in the hospital delivery system. To the extent that insur-
ance insulates direct consumers of hospital services from the actual cost
of those services, especially inpatient services, it removes price as a con-
sideration in any consumer choice with respect to the quantity and lo-
cation of hospital services. Probably more significantly, since demand
for acute inpatient hospital services is usually generated by physicians
rather than by the ultimate consumer, the availability of insurance has
removed price as a factor in decisions by physicians about the type,
quantity or location of such services to be provided patients. The direct
price of a service, then, does not ordinarily function to allocate hospital
resources in the way traditional supply and demand models presume.
Although the price of the particular service may no longer serve as
a primary device of resource allocation, the price of insurance itself
appears to be assuming that function. As the preceding section de-
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scribed, the price of government "insurance," through Medicare and
Medicaid, has generated cost containment efforts by the parties respon-
sible for paying that price, the federal and state governments. Parallel
efforts are beginning to occur in the private sector as well, in which the
price of insurance is reflected not only in tax levies to support the gov-
ernmental programs but in expenditures to pay the premiums necessary
to provide for private (Blue Cross and commercial) insurance coverage.
Increases in the cost of insurance generally reflect increases in the di-
rect cost or price of the services purchased through insurance. In effect,
the price of insurance is becoming a surrogate for the price of services
in mobilizing "consumers" to exercise economic leverage to produce
more favorable prices. In this case, however, the "consumer" is not the
ultimate user of the hospital service, or even the physician prescribing
the service, but the party who is financially responsible for paying for
the insurance policy.
The principal interest groups affected by increases in insurance
prices are employers, employees and the elderly." 9 A substantial pro-
portion of Blue Cross and commercial health insurance is marketed
through employer groups. In many cases, the employer will assume
some portion of the premium involved in purchasing the insurance.
The expense so incurred is allowable as a tax deduction under the In-
ternal Revenue Code, 80 and is not treated as income to the em-
ployee.' 8  The balance of the premium expense is borne by employees,
who may take some portion of the expense as a tax deduction.' 2 In-
creases in hospital costs will push up the cost of insurance to employers
and employees, thereby making these groups potential supporters of
cost containment programs.1
8 3
The impact of the increasing cost of hospital care is also felt in the
out-of-pocket expenditures of the elderly. Indeed, despite the advent of
Medicare, actual out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the elderly for re-
179. The role of these nonprovider interests is specifically recognized in the composition of the
Hospital Policy Review Board. See text accompanying notes 56 & 57 supra.
180. See I.R.C. § 162.
181. I.R.C. § 106. See generally Havighurst, More on Regulation: 4 Reply to Stephen Weiner,
4 Am. J. L. & MED. 243, 248 (1978).
182. I.R.C. § 213.
183. Both groups have been identified as potential sources of support for the efforts at ob-
taining charge and budget control legislation. Indeed, much of the effort undertaken by the
Dukakis Administration in Massachusetts in its strategy that led to enactment of Act of Oct. 15,
1976, ch. 409, 1976 Mass. Laws 522, involved attempts to obtain public commitments from repre-
sentatives of these two groups. (Material in personal files of the author.) A similar strategy has
been undertaken by the Carter Administration nationally in an effort to secure enactment of its
proposed Hospital Cost Containment Act.
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ceiving medical services have increased since the mid-1960s.184 Among
the sources of this increase are increases in the amount of co-insurance
for Medicare'85 and in the price of supplemental insurance purchased
to cover Medicare co-insurance and services not provided under
Medicare.
The economic effect of increases in the cost of coverage has placed
pressures on the insurers themselves to implement strategies to contain
that cost. Only two strategies appear available to them: reducing the
level of benefits provided under any particular policy's coverage, either
by eliminating coverage for certain services or by instituting or ex-
panding co-insurance features, or seeking to contain increases in the
underlying cost of the services purchased. The former strategy is a lim-
ited one: although there appear to have been occurrences of decreased
coverage, there is continuing pressure, particularly from the larger un-
ions, to increase the scope of benefits provided under group insurance
arrangements and to oppose any increased use of co-insurance. Fur-
ther, any decreases in the types of services covered would likely not be
in the highest cost area of acute inpatient hospital services. Another
factor militating against use of this strategy is the appearance of state
statutes mandating certain kinds of coverage.I86 Thus, effective impact
on the rate of increase and the price of premiums could be achieved, if
at all, only by the second strategy; it is significant to note in this context
that both Blue Cross and commercial insurance carriers in Massachu-
setts have been supportive of state cost containment efforts.
187
The price of insurance, then, creates incentives for affected constit-
uencies to support hospital cost containment. Yet there are counter-
vailing factors that reduce the consistency and fervor of such support.
Three factors particularly affect the capacity of the business community
to provide active leadership for cost containment. First, business' tradi-
tional distrust of government regulation produces the attitude that "if
we support regulation of them, might it not increase regulation of us?"
While it is possible to differentiate the need for regulation in the health
184. Mueller & Gibson, Age Differences in Health Care Spending, Fiscal Year 1975, 1976 Soc.
SEC. BULL. 18, 19.
185. Section 1813 of the Social Security Act imposes a requirement on Medicare program
beneficiaries for payment of certain deductibles and co-insurance portions. 42 U.S.C. § 1395e
(1976).
186. See, e.g., MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 175, § 47B (Law. Co-op 1977) (mandating coverage for
certain mental health services).
187. Personal communications to the author by representatives of these groups.
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field from the need for regulation in other areas of the economy,8 8 the
distinction may be irrelevant in the context of general interest in de-
regulation and widespread distrust of government. Thus, business is
very likely to support nongovernmental efforts to contain costs, but
tends to be at best ambivalent about the role government should play
in regulating hospitals.8 9
Second, executives of business organizations often serve on the
boards of local hospitals. 190 Consequently, there may be a perceived
conflict between corporate support of cost containment strategies aimed
at hospitals and the fiduciary responsibilities of corporate executives as
hospital trustees. Even if no legal conflict may exist, a corporate
spokesperson's service on a hospital board may inhibit him or her from
giving strong public endorsement of regulatory initiatives intended to
restrict the cost behavior of hospitals generally.
Finally, it is not clear that the success of cost containment strate-
gies will be of a direct benefit to employers. Premium payments are,
after all, tax deductible. Further, to the extent some savings are
achieved in premium expense, it is likely that employee benefit policies
or collective bargaining will produce a reallocation of such "savings"
into other areas of employee benefit expense. So, unless the employer
has a strong preference concerning the type of fringe benefits it wishes
to provide, savings from premiums may be a matter of indifference.
Similarly, organized labor has reason to be ambivalent about the
potential success of cost containment programs. Major unions are
likely to suffer direct adverse effects. Construction workers stand to
lose job opportunities because of construction deferred or abandoned
as a result of certificate of need decisions. And nonsupervisory workers
fear that they will be the first affected by application of external budg-
etary constraints on hospitals. Consequently, general union support for
cost containment efforts may be conditioned on exceptions for costs as-
188. See Havighurst, Health Care Cost Containment Regulation: Prospects and an Alternative,
3 AM. J. L. & MED. 310, 311-312 (1977).
189. See, e.g., NATIONAL CHAMBER FOUNDATION, A NATIONAL HEALTH CARE STRATEGY:
How BUSINESS CAN IMPROVE HEALTH PLANNING AND REGULATION (1978). The Executive
Summary of this report stresses the importance of businesses participating in public health plan-
ning agencies and private health planning activities to further cost containment objectives, but, as
far as governmental regulation is concerned, only encourages participation in legislative debates
over future health care system regulation without suggesting what positions should be taken. Id
at x.
190. See Berger & Earsy, Occupations of Boston Hospital Board Members, 10 INQUIRY 42
(1973).
19791 1243
NORTH CAROLINA L4 REVIEW
sociated with wages paid to labor.''
The elderly, who are increasingly better organized for advocacy
purposes, may have the least ambivalence about supporting hospital
cost containment activities. Yet, the needs of the elderly relate to so
many areas of society and the economy that organized groups repre-
senting their interests must continuously establish their priorities, with
many other matters competing with hospital issues for attention. In-
deed, in the health field alone, organizations of the elderly are also con-
cerned with such issues as enhancing the quality of care in long-term
care facilities and expanding community-based health services. To the
extent hospitals represent a major source for expanding community-
based services, such groups may be reluctant to take strong antihospital
positions.1
9 2
The pressure on Blue Cross to control premium increases has
clearly had the effect, at least in Massachusetts, of moving it away from
the very close relationship with hospitals that has been a source of past
criticism.'93 Nevertheless, to the extent that Blue Cross' interest in cost
containment is a function of marketing concerns, it may be expected to
be as ambivalent toward governmental cost containment regulation as
the large employers or employee groups that represent its principal
purchasers.
In addition, Blue Cross has other constraints on its capacity to take
an active role in this area. For example, Blue Cross in Massachusetts
relies on voluntary contractual arrangements with hospitals for deter-
mining the terms and conditions of its payment on behalf of subscribers
and for allowing it to pay hospitals on the basis of costs when costs are
191. The 1977 Cost Containment Act proposed by the Carter Administration contained an
exemption from controls for wages and salaries of non-supervisory employees. H.R. 6575, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 124 (1977); S. 1391, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 124 (1977). The 1979 version of the
proposed Cost Containment Act carries forward the proposal for such an exemption. See S. 570,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(b)(2), 2(c)(l)(A)(ii), 7(a)(l)(A). See also Mass. Hospital Workers Local
880, Elements Necessary for Local 880 to Support Hospital Controls (Unpublished position paper
Feb. 15, 1976).
192. Expansion of community-based services by hospitals may be expected to occur in outpa-
tient areas. It is significant in this context to note that the proposed Hospital Cost Containment
Acts introduced by the Carter Administration into the 95th and 96th Congresses have consistently
exempted hospital outpatient revenues from control. See H.R. 6575, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977);
S. 1391, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
193. See, e.g., S. LAW, BLUE CROSS: WHAT WENT WRONG? 25-30 (1974). The corporate by-
laws of Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc., provide that no more than five of the one hundred
corporate members be "providers of health care or organizations representing such providers,"
By-Laws, Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc. (November 1, 1972). The contract negotiated between
Blue Cross and the Massachusetts Hospital Association in 1972-1973, HA-25-TH, represents one
of the most progressive and cost containment-oriented Bluet Cross agreements in the country.
Five hospitals in the state initially refused to sign the agreement because of its provisions.
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lower than charges. 19 4 Despite possible economic hardship, it is possi-
ble for hospitals to survive financially without a Blue Cross contract.1
95
Thus, the harder Blue Cross tries to use the contract for cost contain-
ment purposes, or the more aggressively Blue Cross supports govern-
mental cost containment programs, the more likely it is that hospitals
may refuse to enter into contracts with Blue Cross.'96 In that situation,
Blue Cross in Massachusetts is for all practical purposes bound to pay
full charges. 9 7 It thereby loses some of its competitive advantage over
commercial insurers, who would ordinarily make payments at charges,
not the lower of costs or charges.
Unlike Blue Cross, commercial insurers do not rely on a contrac-
tual relationship with hospitals to determine the terms and conditions
of payment. These insurers generally make payment based on hospital
charges, which may or may not be related to the cost of providing serv-
ices. When charges are higher than costs,' 98 commercial insurers may
be at a competitive disadvantage compared with Blue Cross, which
under such circumstances will make payment based on cost. As a re-
sult, these insurers have a strong incentive to support those cost con-
tainment programs that call for regulating charges by relating them to
definitions of allowable cost. Indeed, in order to eliminate the auto-
matic differential that operates in favor of Blue Cross in most states,
commercial insurers have made strenuous efforts to encourage the de-
velopment of charge control programs that also provide for uniform
rates for all purchasers.' 99
194. See MASS. STAT. ANN. ch. 176A, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1977).
195. See letter to Stephen M. Weiner, Special Assistant to the Governor, from Henry D.
Jones, President, Blue Cross of Massachusetts, Inc. (Aug. 9, 1973); RSC HA-27 Statement (1977),
supra note 24, at 3.
196. See RSC HA-27 Statement (1977), supra note 24, at 2-3.
197. See Massachusetts ex rel. Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc. v. Mercy Hosp., No. 72-150
(Mass. Sup. Ct., November 13, 1972).
198. Charges may be higher than "cost" where a particular purchaser employs a restrictive
definition of cost, such as excluding an allowance for bad debt and free care; or when the hospital
wishes to build in a financial cushion or surplus. For examples of differences in cost definitions,
see note 170 supra.
199. The Health Insurance Association of America (HIAA) sought hospital charge control
legislation in Massachusetts as early as 1972. See S. No. 875 (1972); letter from Harold Hestnes to
Hon. Robert L. Yasi, Secretary of Administration and Finance, Commonwealth of Massachusetts
(Feb. 25, 1972). In 1977, funded primarily by the private insurance carriers, Government Re-
search Corporation of Washington, D.C., developed through a task force a model bill for state-
level ratesetting programs. See Statement of Robert D. Kilpatrick, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Connecticut General Insurance Corporation, on the Hospital Cost Containment Act of
1977, delivered to Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Human Resources Committee, June 21,
1977. The model bill provided the basis for a legislative proposal announced by Senator
Schweiker as an alternative to the Administration's Hospital Cost Containment Act. See 123
CONG. REC. E4220-21 (daily ed. July 1, 1977).
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On the other hand, because of the absence of traditional relations
with hospitals, the commercial insurers have had less involvement his-
torically than Blue Cross in health policy development. Further, be-
cause most of them market other lines of insurance, their political
attention must be directed to a number of issues simultaneously, which
dilutes their capacity to provide effective political support to hospital
cost containment efforts specifically.
This survey of the major potential cost control constituencies sug-
gests that the state, in seeking to develop allies in its policy objectives,
may find relatively little strong and consistent support for government
cost containment initiatives. The state's position of relative isolation is
further complicated when one considers an additional political charac-
teristic of the hospital system-the status of hospitals themselves.
3. The Status of Hospitals
Virtually all of the acute care general hospitals in Massachusetts
are nonprofit institutions. 00 They enjoy the respect normally accorded
charitable organizations. Further, most of the state's acute care general
hospitals, with the possible exception of some of the major teaching
institutions, are strongly identified with the communities in which they
are located or to which they provide services.2 0 ' This community iden-
tification is even stronger in nonprofit hospitals located away from
large urban areas. 20 2 The local citizens view the hospital as "theirs";
there is a strong pattern of relationships with the facility, generally dat-
ing back for some period of time, and there is a sense of "pride" associ-
ated with having ready access to hospital services.
Most importantly, perhaps, the trustees of such hospitals are gen-
erally drawn from the dominant social and economic strata of the com-
munity.20 3 This has two beneficial effects for the hospital. First, the
hospital may, as a result and with some reason, argue that its board
understands the community needs, and those needs will therefore be
adequately represented in internal hospital decisions with respect to
prices and services. This argument easily becomes intertwined with the
view, produced by the usual tension between small local communities
200. Of the 122 acute hospitals listed in the MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
HEALTH, HEALTH DATA ANNUAL (1976), it is estimated that only ten were proprietary. Of that
group, three ceased to function as acute hospitals after 1976.
201. BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1979, at 1, col. I (discussing responses of citizens of small towns
to perceived threat to local hospitals contained in draft state health plan).
202. Id
203. See Berger & Earsy, supra note 190.
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and state government, that the large "insensitive" state bureaucracy
does not adequately understand the local scene and should not try to
impose its view on the community.2°4 Second, the board provides a
strong base from which hospitals may, individually or collectively, de-
velop and exert political influence, especially on local state legislators.
The favored status of the individual community-based hospital is
not necessarily diminished by generalized political and social concerns
about cost containment. As discussed earlier, the direct impact of the
cost increases incurred by a particular hospital is usually diffused
through tax and insurance mechanisms, 20 5 so that the community using
the services of the hospital does not ordinarily feel directly the added
financial burden placed on the health system by the institution's spe-
cific cost increasing decisions. Thus, while cost containment as an ab-
stract concept may be supported by members of the community, it is a
very different matter when an individual state cost containment deci-
sion has an adverse impact on the community's hospital, as opposed to
hospitals generally.
V. STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT HOSPITAL COST CONTAINMENT
REGULATORY AGENCIES
The preceding sections indicate some of the difficulties that con-
front "reformist" hospital cost regulatory agencies. Structural charac-
teristics of the hospital service industry deprive the agencies of readily
available "natural" constituencies to provide political support for their
objectives. Further, the availability of procedural mechanisms by
which segments of the public may participate in the agencies' deci-
sional processes has not provided a vehicle for the agencies to develop
political understanding of and support for their policies.
These difficulties that attend the functioning of "reformist" agen-
cies raise the likelihood that they will evolve into "reluctant" ones as
lack of a strong, supportive political constituency undercuts the willing-
ness of the agencies to attempt substantial reform of the hospital indus-
try. Indeed, perhaps the only factor that may retard such an evolution
is the continuing budgetary concern of the government, 06 which may
be expected to support strong containment efforts by the regulatory
agencies.
204. See BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
205. See text accompanying notes 178-199 supra.
206. See text accompanying notes 163-177 supra.
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Is such an evolution inevitable, however? The question is obvi-
ously an important one, both to the agencies currently engaged in hos-
pital cost regulatory activities and to policy analysts who support
increased governmental action to shrink the size of the existing hospital
systemn. Asked another way, are strategies available that the agencies
may pursue to build political support for their reformist objectives? 20 7
Two approaches, at least, represent possibilities for building such
support. Neither, however, provides any high degree of certainty of
success. The first encompasses an intensive educational outreach effort
by the agencies, the purpose of which is (a) to develop an understand-
ing among different constituency groups of the relationship between
the agencies' objectives and the group's particular conerns, (b) to seek a
set of common understandings and objectives that may be reflected in
the agencies' operations, and (c) to convert the educational activities
into ongoing relationships that can be translated into political support
for the common objectives. The second strategy involves developing a
formal linkage between the agencies' regulatory activities on the one
hand, and on the other, processes that may be viewed as having similar
objectives but that necessarily involve a broader diversity of views than
those represented in the agencies' activities. Of particular interest for
linkage with regulatory activities are the planning and review responsi-
bilities imposed on health systems agencies and state health planning
and development agencies under the National Health Planning and
Resources Development Act of 1974.20
A. Educational Outreach Efforts
This strategy proceeds from the view that if interest groups do not
come to the agency, that is, are not generally willing to participate in
the formal20 9 agency proceedings intended to invite broad public par-
ticipation, then the agency must go to the interest groups. Ordinarily,
such a strategy is more characteristic of legislative lobbying efforts on
207. The types of strategies considered here are not the more traditional ones involving efforts
by the agency to increase the amount of personnel and budgetary resources made available to it.
See, e.g., B. SMITH, LIVING WITH CIVIL SERVICE: THE MASSACHUsETrs EXPERIENCE (1976).
Nor do they encompass efforts to restructure agency process to permit more effective interest
group participation, an issue discussed in the text accompanying notes 1-1 supra.
208. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
88 Stat. 2225 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300k, 300t (1976)).
209. For purposes of this discussion the term "formal" is not used in the sense of the federal
Administrative Procedures Act concept of formal rulemaking or adjudication as distinct from
informal rulemaking. Instead, it is intended to distinguish agency action as required by statute,
such as public notice and comment, from other kinds of agency actions.
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behalf of an agency. For example, the Dukakis Administration in
Massachusetts undertook extensive educational efforts in 1975 and
1976, particularly with business, labor and elderly groups, to explain
the importance of the proposed Hospital Cost Containment Bill that
culminated in Chapter 409.210 Similar efforts have been undertaken by
the Carter Administration nationally in 1979 in support of its proposed
Hospital Cost Containment Act.
2 1
Such outreach efforts, consciously aimed at developing pub-
lic/political support for an agency's position, are relatively rare at the
level of administrative, as opposed to legislative, activities. One exam-
ple, however, is the so-called generic process used in developing stan-
dards and criteria for the Massachusetts DON program.21 2 The process
involves extensive consultation among interested and knowledgeable
parties aimed at developing standards and criteria to be embodied in
regulations governing treatment of projects proposed under the DON
program. The DPH does not undertake the consultative process with a
detailed product already developed, but instead makes use of the com-
mon objective of the parties and the value placed on developing accept-
able cost containment-oriented rules as the parameters of the process.
The consultative process itself shapes the final product, which takes the
form of recommendations for proposed DPH regulations.
At least theoretically, the DPH's use of the generic process enables
it to make participating groups aware of its values and objectives. At
the same time, participation by the various groups themselves may
commit them politically to the end result, even if any one of them
alone, including the DPH, would not have been independently willing
to accept the product. By entering into the process, the DPH or another
regulatory agency has the opportunity to shape the results of its policy
goals, but at the same time, and in exchange for that, it must recognize
that, to a large extent, it gives up its ability to determine the precise
details of the resulting recommendations. Just as the participant
groups are psychologically committed to the result, if the process is sen-
sitively handled, so is the agency committed to it as well.
The generic process is organized around specific products. One
can envision a variant of this educational strategy that does not neces-
sarily produce a set of recommendations for proposed regulations, but
210. See background documents and strategy papers concerning efforts to enact H. 3160, in
the personal files of the author.
211. See, e.g., HEALTH REGULATION LETrER, March 10, 1979, at 1-2.
212. See Massachusetts Dep't of Public Health, Draft State Health Plan §§ 1.15-1.16 (1978).
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instead allows for an informal and ongoing sharing of views and objec-
tives by diverse sets of groups, all of which are affected by the agency's
responsibilities. Three characteristics mark this kind of process: infor-
mality, continuity and focus on the agency's general programmatic ac-
tivities, not on a specific product.2"3 Such a process permits the agency
to explicate its policies and objectives in a more discursive fashion than
generally attends agency statements in formal administrative proce-
dures. It thereby provides a forum in which the agency can develop
understanding for its positions among the participating groups. At the
same time, such a continuing interchange would permit the other par-
ticipants to educate the agency about their attitudes and positions in a
more detailed fashion than might ordinarily be available in formal pro-
cedures. The agency might thereby better understand the impact of its
activities on various affected groups, an impact that might not be read-
ily discernable in formal statements prepared by representatives of the
various groups for presentation at public hearings.2"4 With such an un-
derstanding, the agency would be more likely to consider alternative
methods of achieving its objectives.
While the educational approach represents one strategy available
to a reformist agency, use of it raises a number of problems. Three are
particularly important. First, none of the possible variants of this
model precludes co-option of the agency by dominant industry inter-
ests, which are presumably entitled to participation. Certain factors,
however, may impede such a result. First, participation would be open
to more than just the agency and the regulated industry. Other groups,
the interests of which are not necessarily consistent with the industry's,
would be included. In either a task-specific or an ongoing relationship,
this diversity of participation should serve as a countervailing force to
the industry's position. Second, it may be expected that co-option oc-
curs when the agency either willingly or passively accepts such a result.
The agency's participation in the educational outreach strategy, how-
ever, is intended specifically to avoid such a result and to develop sup-
213. An example of one type within this model is the Maryland Health Care Coalition, largely
inspired by the Health Insurance Association of American (HIAA), in which the Maryland Health
Services Costs Review Commission participates. See Health Insurance Association of America,
Goals and Objectives of the Maryland Health Care Consortium (1978).
214. The model envisioned is different from an advisory council structure in that (a) it is not
officially established by a statute or formal agency action and (b) participation by various interest
groups is more active, with more individuals from each group involved than is typically the case
with advisory groups. Further, advisory boards typically function to provide advice to the agency
but not necessarily to communicate agency positions to the constituent parties. The model de-
scribed in effect functions in the first place to communicate information from the agency to private
groups.
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port for the agency in its regulatory relations with the industry. In a
sense, then, an agency willing to enter into such a strategy will already
be conscious of efforts to co-opt it and can develop countervailing tac-
tics to prevent co-option from occurring.
Second, the educational outreach strategy may render formal pub-
lic notice and comment processes irrelevant or meaningless. Major
policies may be agreed upon and, in the case of the DON generic proc-
ess, specific regulatory provisions may be worked out in some detail
prior to promulgation of proposed regulations. The extent to. which
informal activities undercut the meaningfulness of formal agency ac-
tions is necessarily a matter of some concern. As a result of this con-
cern, new types of public notice have been developed, such as the
notice of intent to issue proposed regulations, evidencing an effort to
move the possibility for public participation back into earlier stages of
the agency's policy development process than may have ordinarily oc-
curred under standard APA notice requirements. Further, the educa-
tional outreach strategy, which is initiated by the agency, does not
necessarily involve all the parties that might respond to a public notice.
Indeed, to the extent the agency attempts to target particular politically
influential groups for inclusion in the educational process, the strategy
is likely to encompass participation by a relatively small segment of the
available spectrum of interests. Yet if common agreement on policy
and objectives emerges from processes like the DON generic process
described earlier, then the decision concerning inclusion or exclusion of
certain interests could effectively foreclose the excluded parties from
any meaningful participation at any stage of the policy development
process, up through the stage of formal adoption. The agency may
thereby gain political support at the expense of traditional notions of
public accountability and participation. Even though there may be no
extensive public participation in the agency's formal procedures, 215 the
possibility that such participation can occur and have an impact is an
important principle to retain.
Third, the idea of an agency initiating efforts to gain public and
political support for its policies is not one envisioned by traditional le-
gal models of the administrative agency. These models tend generally
to derive from considerations of the legitimacy of administrative ac-
tions.2 16 Legitimacy may attach to agency action to the extent the ac-
215. See text accompanying notes 86 & 87 supra.
216. For a discussion of the legitimacy of actions by administrative agencies, see J. FREED-
MAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 259-266 (1978).
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tion can be seen as clearly following from a legislative policy,2 17 or as
involving application of objective expertise to a particular set of factual
circumstances, 2 18 or as representing a conception of a public interest
developed from a balancing by the agency of conflicting and competing
interests. The models, based on these sources of legitimacy, have a
common characteristic in that they appear to assume a passive agency
having as its only interest the performance of its delegated responsibili-
ties. A reformist agency undertaking an educational outreach strategy,
however, is assumed to be an activist agency attempting to build sup-
port for its position. The position taken presumably derives from an
interpretation of the agency's legislative authority, and therefore is one
the agency can legally--even if not necessarily politically-sustain.
Thus, the DPH or the RSC, in administering DON or Chapter 409,
could undertake an outreach strategy without having questions raised
about the policies it is pursuing. But an agency seeking cost contain-
ment objectives in the absence of a defined legislative mandate-such
as if one of the Massachusetts agencies were to undertake a shrinkage
strategy under current statutory provisions2 19-might face not only
strictly legal questions concerning the scope of its authority, but ques-
tions concerning the very legitimacy of the agency's conduct. In pursu-
ing an educational outreach strategy in the absence of relatively clear
statutory policy, the agency is in effect going beyond the conception of
agency action embodied in traditional doctrines. A significant issue re-
quiring further exploration is what theory of legitimacy would support
the agency under such circumstances.22 °
B. The Planning Strategy
An alternative strategy that allows the agency to retain a passive
role while developing support for its positions is to build upon the plan-
ning and review activities undertaken under the National Health Plan-
ning and Resources Development Act of 1974. This federal legislation
establishes two planning bodies within a state that, in their composi-
tion, reflect the varied interest groups within the health system: the
health systems agency (HSA) and the statewide health coordinating
217. For an analysis of this concept, see Stewart, supra note 2, at 1672-76.
218. Id at 1677-78.
219. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
220. Relatively little rigorous analysis has been undertaken of the concept of agency legiti-
macy. An excellent example of this limited literature is J. FREEDMAN, supra note 216.
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council (SHCC).2 2 ' The HSA is responsible for developing the health
systems plan (HSP) for its area, and the annual implementation plan
(AiP) aimed at achieving the goals of the HSP. 222 It also reviews and
provides recommendations on such matters as applications from the
area for various federal funds, 223 the appropriateness of institutional
services provided within the area224 and applications for certificates of
need emanating from institutional providers within the area.2 5 While
not specifically required as yet, it may be expected that review activities
undertaken by an HSA will eventually be based on standards derived
from the area HSP and AIP.
The SHCC is responsible for adopting a state health plan (SHP),
which is made up from the area HSPs with adjustments for differences
arising from a statewide perspective. 26 Again, while not yet specifi-
cally required by federal statute, the SHP may eventually provide the
basis for standards applicable in the administration of statewide appro-
priateness review or certificate of need processes by the state health
planning and development agency.227
Two characteristics of the National Health Planning and Re-
sources Development Act of 1974 suggest that the process of develop-
ing the HSP and SHP is intended to be a consensual one. First are the
requirements concerning composition of the boards of the HSAs and of
the SHCC.22  Membership is prescribed to reflect and balance the di-
221. National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-641,
§§ 1512, 1513, 1524, 88 Stat. 2234 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-1, -2, 300m-3 (1976)).
222. Id § 1513(b)(2), (3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(b)(2), (3) (1976)).
223. Id § 1513(e) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(e) (1976)).
224. Id § 1513(g) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(g) (1976)).
225. Id § 1513(f) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(f) (1976)).
226. Id § 1524(c)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300m-3(c) (1976)).
227. One version of the proposed amendments to the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act of 1974 introduced into the first session of the 96th Congress, calls for requiring
that certificate of need decisions "shall not be inconsistent with the State health plan." See pro-
posed section 1527(a)(6) of Title XV of the Public Health Service Act, H.R. 3041, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1979).
228. The Act provides for the following membership on the governing board and executive
committee, if any, of an HSA:
(i) A majority (but not more than 60 per centum of the members) shall be residents
of the health service area served by the entity who are consumers of health care and who
are not (nor within the twelve months preceding appointment have been) providers of
health care and who are broadly representative of the social, economic, linguistic and
racial populations, geographic areas of the health service area, and major purchasers of
health care.
(ii) The remainder of the members shall be residents of the health service area
served by the agency who are providers of health care and who represent ( ) physicians
(particularly practicing physicians), dentists, nurses, and other health professionals, (II)
health care institutions (particularly hospitals, long-term care facilities, and health main-
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versity of interests in the health system. Almost as a matter of neces-
sity, agreement upon an HSP or SHP from such an organizational
structure must come from a process of negotiation and accommodation.
A final product depends on development of a block representing a ma-
jority of the members, not a single decisionmaker. But the credibility
of the process-that is, the willingness of all the requisite parties to
participate in it-turns on each party being satisfied to some extent
with the accommodation.
The second characteristic is that there is no direct authority for the
tenance organizations), (III) health care insurers, (IV) health professional schools, and
(V) the allied health professions. Not less than one-third of the providers of health care
who are members of the governing body or executive committee of a health systems
agency shall be direct providers of health care (as described in section 1531(3)).
(iii) The membership shall-
(I) include (either through consumer or provider members) public elected
officials and other representatives of governmental authorities in the agency's health
service area and representatives of public and private agencies in the area concerned
with health,
(II) include a percentage of individuals who reside in nonmetropolitan areas
within the health service area which percentage is equal to the percentage of resi-
dents of the area who reside in nonmetropolitan areas, and
(Ill) if the health systems agency serves an area in which there is located one
or more hospitals or other health care facilities of the Veterans' Administration,
include, as an ex officio member, an individual whom the Chief Medical Director of
the Veterans' Administration shall have designated for such purpose, and if the
agency serves an area in which there is located one or more qualified health mainte-
nance organizations (within the meaning of section 1310), include at least one mem-
ber who is representative of such organizations.
42 U.S.C. § 3001-1(b)(3)(C) (1976). The Act provides for the following membership on the SHCC:
(A) (i) A SHCC shall have no fewer than sixteen representatives appointed by the
Governor of the State from lists of at least five nominees submitted to the Governor by
each of the health systems agencies designated for health service areas which fall, in
whole or in part, within the State.
"(ii) Each such health systems agency shall be entitled to the same number of
representatives on the SHCC.
"(iii) Each such health systems agency shall be entitled to at least two representa-
tives on the SHCC. Of the representatives of a health systems agency, not less than one-
half shall be individuals who are consumers of health care and who are not providers of
health care.
"(B) In addition to the appointments made under subparagraph (A) the Governor
of the State may appoint such persons (including State officials, public elected officials,
and other representatives of governmental authorities within the State) to serve on the
SHCC as he deems appropriate; except that (i) the number of persons appointed to the
SHCC under this subparagraph may not exceed 40 per centum of the total membership
of the SHCC, and (ii) a majority of the persons appointed by the Governor shall be
consumers of health care who are not also providers of health care.
"(C) Not less than one-third of the providers of health care who are members of a
SHCC shall be direct providers of health care (as described in section 1531(3)).
"(D) Where two or more hospitals or other health care facilities of the Veterans'
Administration are located in a State, the SHCC shall, in addition to the appointed
members, include, as an ex officio member, an individual whom the Chief Medical Di-
rector of the Veterans' Administration shall have designated as a representative of such
facilities."
Id. § 3001-2(c) (1976).
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HSAs or the SHCC to implement the plans. The only specific reference
in the Act to a plan implementation strategy involves recourse to per-
suasion and the use of technical assistance and developmental fund-
ing.229 As was noted earlier, there is no requirement that the plans
provide the basis for recommendations or findings on the appropriate-
ness of existing institutional services or the need for new institutional
services.230
These two characteristics, taken together, suggest the logic of com-
bining the planning and regulatory processes, so that the plans provide
the policy basis for regulatory decisions. 23' While there are clearly lo-
gistical and philosophical difficulties associated with such a linkage,232
there would be significant advantages to the regulatory agencies from
such an arrangement. First, the goals and objectives of the planning
process, as established in the Act and such documents as the National
229. The Act provides the following with respect to implementing HSPs and AlPs:
(I) The agency shall seek, to the extent practicable, to implement its HSP and AIP
with the assistance of individuals and public and private entities in its health service
area.
(2) The agency may provide,'in accordance with the priorities established in the
AIP, technical assistance to individuals and public and private entities for the develop-
ment of projects and programs which the agency determines are necessary to achieve the
health systems described in the HSP...
(3) The agency shall, in accordance with the priorities established in the AIP,
make grants to public and nonprofit private entities and enter into contracts with indi-
viduals and public and nonprofit private entities to assist them in planning and develop-
ing projects and programs which the agency determines are necessary for the
achievement of the health systems described in the HSP. Such grants and contracts shall
be made from the Area Health Services Development Fund of the agency established
with funds provided under grants made under section 1640 ...
42 U.S.C. § 3001-2(c) (1976).
230. This distinction between the project review responsibilities of HSAs, either through ap-
propriateness review or review of new institutional services, and the goals and objectives of the
HSPs and AlPs is implicitly recognized in DHEW regulations governing reviews by state health
planning agencies with respect to certificates of need for new institutional services. 42 C.F.R.
§ 123.407(a) (9) (1978) requires the state agency to provide to the HSA "a written detailed state-
ment" of the reasons why its decision regarding a proposed new institutional health services is
inconsistent "with a recommendation made with respect thereto by the health systems agency mak-
ing such recommendation." (Emphasis added.) The regulation further provides that if the state
agency "makes a decision regarding a proposed new institutional health service which the State
Agency determines is not consistent with the goals of the applicable health systemsplan. . . or the
priorities ofthe applicable annual implementation plan," the agency is again required to submit a
"written, detailed statement of the reasons for the inconsistency." Id. § 123.407(a) (11) (emphasis
added).
The separation of these two provisions implies that the recommendation of the HSA with
respect to a certificate of need application itself need not be consistent with the HSA's own HSP or
AIP.
231. See generally K. BAUER, THE ARRANGED MARRIAGE OF HEALTH PLANNING AND REGU-
LATION FOR COST CONTAINMENT UNDER P. L. 93-641 - SOME IssuES TO BE FACED (1977);
Weiner, supra note 29.
232. See Weiner, supra note 29, at 57-63.
NORTH C4ROLIN4 LAW REVIEW
Guidelines for Health Planning,233 are compatible with the objectives
of the cost containment regulatory agencies. The overview contained
in the Supplemental Information accompanying the National Guide-
lines, for example, stresses the importance of cost containment as a pre-
requisite for achieving other goals in the health delivery system.234
Second, the development of the plans occurs through a structured,
community-based, and broadly participatory process, at both the area
and state levels, involving public hearings and decisions by representa-
tive groups. The types of interest that ought to participate in the formal
regulatory proceedings participate in the plan development process.
Because of the consensual nature of the process, it may be expected, as
suggested earlier, that the participants will be more committed to the
end-product than they would be if the same product emerged from a
formal regulatory proceeding.
Consequently, were the regulatory agencies to adopt the goals and
policies of the planning documents as the basis for their decisions, there
would be a high likelihood that the same groups who participate in the
development process would support the agency's decisions. To the ex-
tent that the plans were themselves converted into institution-specific
recommendations and findings through the AIP, certificate of need or
appropriateness reviews, adoption of these recommendations and find-
ings as regulatory decisions would also presumably enhance the accept-
ability of those decisions.
Despite the political advantages to the regulatory agencies of link-
ing planning with regulation, there are some pitfalls. First, there are
logistical problems of administrative law associated with translating the
plans and institution-specific recommendations into regulatory deci-
sions, although most of the problems appear capable of resolution.235
Second, there is no assurance that the plan development process will
actually be free of dominant industry influence, despite the minority
status of providers on the HSA board and on the SHCC. While at least
one recent study has suggested that the anticipated co-option of HSAs
may not be occurring, it ascribes the result at least in part to HEW's
insistence on evaluating HSAs from the perspective of cost contain-
ment concerns.236 There may, however, be no structural characteristics
233. 42 C.F.R. pt. 121 (1978).
234. 43 Fed. Reg. 13,040 (1978).
235. See text accompanying notes 231-34 supra.
236. See Sapolsky, Altman & Greene, Assessing the Health Planning Experiences Under P. L.
93-641 9-10, 20 (1978) (unpublished paper on file in the office of the North Carolina Law Review).
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preventing provider dominance. At the least, regulatory agencies
adopting the planning strategy must carefully assess the extent to which
HSAs and the SHCC are pursuing objectives compatible with the inter-
ests of the agencies.
237
Third, incorporation of planning outcomes into regulatory deci-
sions may affect the consensual nature of the planning process. The
capacity of the HSAs and the SHCC to develop consensus on plans
may in large part be due to the very absence of direct means of imple-
menting the policies of the planning documents. Linking planning and
regulation may increase the stakes associated with participation, partic-
ularly for providers, and may make providers far less willing to cooper-
ate in plan development. Such an occurrence would undermine the
consensual nature of the process-the major value of planning as a
means of providing support to regulatory decisions.
The strategy of linking planning and regulation may be of signifi-
cant advantage to the cost containment regulatory agencies seeking
public and political support for their decisions. Nevertheless, there
may be difficulties, practical and theoretical, associated with the strat-
egy that require extensive analysis before embarking on it. Since ques-
tions and difficulties are associated with both of the two major support-
building strategies, however, it may be necessary for the agencies to
undertake a certain amount of risk if they intend to continue acting as
reformers of the regulated system.
237. The potential co-option of HSAs raises a difficult question of legitimacy. If a governmen-
tally sanctioned and apparently democratic process is not capable of preventing one group or a
relatively small number of groups from dominating the results of that process, what arguments
support the greater legitimacy of a bureaucratic agency refusing to accept the values associated
with the result and superimposing its own views on the process?
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